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Comprehending quantity and order information denoted by numbers are important 
abilities in everyday life in most modern societies.  Better understanding of how numbers 
are psychologically represented can lead to better educational practices.  Much 
psychological evidence suggests that numbers are represented in a spatial format, as in a 
“mental number line” in which smaller magnitudes are associated with left space and 
larger magnitudes with right space. This representation can lead to facilitation or 
interference for selection of a spatially oriented response, such as making a left- or right-
hand key-press, or orienting attention to left or right sides of visual space.  Two event-
related potential (ERP) experiments were conducted to examine effects on response-
selection and visuospatial attention resulting from associations between numerical 
magnitude and spatial coordinates of bimanual responses and attentional orienting. 
Experiment 1 examined the time course of response-selection processes as modulated by 
spatial-numeric associations of response codes (SNARC) in combination with 
expectancy, in a task of comparing the magnitude of two sequentially presented digits.  In 
SNARC-compatible conditions, participants made a left-hand response to say the second 
digit was smaller, and a right-hand response to say it was larger, than the first digit.  In 
SNARC-incompatible conditions participants made a right-hand response to say the 
second digit was smaller, and a left-hand response to say it was larger, than the first digit.  
The first digit to be compared gave advance information about the likely magnitude of 
the second digit to be compared, and thus about the likely response to be required.  
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Behavioral response times (RTs) showed that interference from SNARC-incompatible 
response mapping was attenuated when the first digit gave complete information about 
the upcoming second digit and the required response.  However, SNARC interference 
was still evident in ERP covert measures of mental processing.  Lateralized readiness 
potentials (LRPs) showed evidence for SNARC interference at intermediate stages of 
processing, consistent with a limited amount of ERP research into SNARC effects, when 
response-cuing provided complete information in advance about the required response.  
Additionally the non-lateralized P300 showed clear SNARC effects in contrast to 
previous findings.  Results are discussed in terms of a modified “dual-route” model, in 
which fast activation of task-irrelevant information competes for response-selection with 
slow activation of information related to task goals.  Experiment 2 examined whether 
visuospatial attention shifts can be elicited automatically by numerical magnitude, by 
presenting task-irrelevant visual probes in left or right peripheral visual space following 
small- or large-magnitude digit pre-cues.  Early visual ERPs showed a possible trend for 
enhancement after small-magnitude digits regardless of visual hemifield in which the 
probe appeared.  Results across experiments suggest that spatialized number 
representation has different consequences within reference frames for either action or 







 Quantity and order are two important features of events in the world that can be 
described by numbers.  Comprehending numbers is important for survival and effective 
action in most contemporary societies.  Better understanding of how numbers are 
represented psychologically and by the brain has potential implications for pedagogy and 
policy making.  Numbers refer to abstract conceptual entities.  But how are they 
represented in the brain?  Researchers in cognitive psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience are increasingly concerned with questions about how human beings derive 
meaning from experience, think about abstractions, understand concepts, interpret 
symbols, and construct metaphors (Barsalou, 1999; 2008a; 2008b; Barsalou, Simmons, 
Barbey & Wilson, 2003).  Concepts of “love,” “power,” or “identity” have no concrete, 
physical objects as referents.  How are such abstract ideas represented in the brain?  
Traditional approaches in cognitive psychology have asserted that symbols and other 
abstractions are represented in the brain in a central, amodal, propositional format 
separated from sensory-motor systems dedicated to perceiving and acting on the 
environment (Glenberg, 1997; Killeen & Glenberg, 2010).  Increasingly however, 
researchers are considering the general proposal that concepts and other products of the 
imagination are grounded in the same sensory-motor translations responsible for 
perception and action (Barsalou, 1999; 2008a; 2008b; Barsalou et al., 2003; Gallese & 
Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg, 1997; Killeen & Glenberg, 2010).               
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 Whether symbolic and conceptual thought depends on abstract, amodal 
representations or arises through the development of “perceptual symbol systems” is 
currently debated (Barsalou, 1999; 2008a; 2008b; Barsalou et al., 2003).  Similarly, 
whether numerical information is represented in an amodal, abstract format is currently 
debated (Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; Rips, Bloomfield & Asmuth, 2008).  Evidence 
that numbers are represented in a spatial analog format, such as a “mental number line” 
has long been found in classic effects such as the “size effect” in which magnitude 
comparisons are faster for relatively small numbers, and the “distance effect” in which 
magnitude comparisons are faster when the difference between two numbers is relatively 
small (Cohen-Kadosh, Lammertyn, & Izard, 2008; Moyer & Landauer, 1967)  
 It has been proposed that neural representations of number may be 
opportunistically mapped onto representations for more concrete dimensions of 
experience, such as space (Dehaene, 1997); similar to other theories about how the 
abstract concept of time is represented (Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; 
Boroditsky & Gaby, 2010).  A Theory of Magnitude (ATOM; Bueti & Walsh, 2009; 
Walsh, 2003a) proposes that attributes of space, time, number, and other quantities are 
processed by a generalized magnitude estimating system supported by posterior parietal 
cortex (PPC).  Communication between quantity-sensitive parietal neurons and 
frontoparietal circuits coding response parameters is one hypothesized mechanism for the 
so-called spatial-numeric association of response codes (SNARC; Dehaene, 1997; 
Dehaene, Bossini & Giraux, 1993; Dehaene et al., 2003; Hubbard, Piazza, Pinel & 




 The SNARC effect has been reliably observed across a range of experimental 
paradigms since its discovery in a magnitude comparison task (Dehaene, Dupoux & 
Mehler, 1990) but has been most often investigated using a parity judgment task 
(Dehaene et al., 1993; Hubbard et al., 2005; Wood & Fischer, 2008; Wood, Willmes, 
Nuerk & Fischer, 2008).  In the parity task of the seminal investigations (Dehaene et al., 
1993), participants were instructed to make a left-hand response if a centrally-presented 
stimulus digit was odd and a right-hand response if it was even (with response-hand-
mapping alternating across blocks).  Although magnitude information is not strictly 
necessary to perform parity judgments, responses to small-magnitude digits were faster 
for left-hand responses (SNARC-compatible) and slower for right-hand responses 
(SNARC-incompatible); while the reverse pattern was observed for large-magnitude 
digits (Dehaene et al., 1993).  Like other kinds of psychophysical comparisons, SNARC 
effects were shown to depend on the range of magnitudes not on the absolute magnitudes.  
The SNARC effect is widely assumed to depend on a spatially directed “mental number 
line” representation, automatically elicited by numerical stimuli (Dehaene et al., 1993; 
Hubbard et al., 2005; Wood & Fischer, 2008; Wood et al., 2008).  The SNARC effect is 
thought to provide additional evidence that numbers are represented in a spatial analog 
format, like the “size effect” and “distance effect” (Cohen-Kadosh et al., 2008; Moyer & 
Landauer, 1967).    
 SNARC interference appears similar to the “Simon effect” (Simon & Rudell, 
1967) that arises from stimulus-response (S-R) compatibility (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & 
Osman,, 1990; Proctor & Cho, 2006).  Simon interference occurs when participants must 
make bimanual responses to stimuli that are lateralized in visual space.  Faster right-hand 
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responses are observed to stimuli in the right visual field versus stimuli in the left visual 
field.  Likewise, left-hand responses are faster to stimuli in the left visual field versus 
stimuli in the right visual field.  SNARC interference appears similar to Simon 
interference because an irrelevant lateralized stimulus dimension interferes with a 
lateralized response. 
 However for the Simon effect the task-irrelevant dimension is explicitly spatial, 
whereas for the SNARC effect this is not so.  In contrast, in SNARC phenomena the 
spatial dimension is implicit and perhaps only metaphorically related to an oriented 
number line.  Precise relations between SNARC and Simon effects remain to be fully 
clarified and both types of phenomena may be special cases of even more general S-R 
compatibility (Proctor & Cho, 2006).  However, current evidence tends to the conclusion 
that SNARC and Simon effects are dissociable (Hubbard et al., 2005; Mapelli, Rusconi & 
Umiltà, 2003; Rusconi, Turatto, & Umiltà, 2007).   
 A small number of studies have used ERP to examine SNARC effects on 
response-selection (Gevers, Ratinckx, De Baene & Fias, 2006; Keus, Jenks & Schwartz, 
2005), discussed in the following.   
ERP: SNARC in Parity Judgments 
 Keus and colleagues (2005) examined the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) 
during a parity judgment task.  The LRP, recorded at C3/C4 electrodes over pre-motor 
cortex, is a measure of relative brain activation contralateral versus ipsilateral to the 
responding hand (Coles, Gratton & Donchin, 1988; Gratton, 1998; Masaki, Takasawa & 
Yamazaki, 2000; Masaki, Wild-Wall, Sangalis & Sommer, 2004).  Thus the LRP can 
give a real-time picture of brain activation related to making a choice decision that is 
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made by a left- or right-handed response.  The LRP is derived by subtracting ipsilateral 
from contralateral activation, relative to the responding hand on a given trial, and then 
averaged over hands.  This subtraction method is beneficial because it removes from the 
ERP activation that is 1) the same across hemispheres and 2) always different across 
hemispheres.  Thus the LRP removes activation that is extraneous to specifically 
selecting, preparing, and executing a response with a given hand.   
 Keus and colleagues (2005) examined the LRP time-locked either to the stimulus 
(S-LRP) or the response (R-LRP).  The basic logic behind examining both S-LRP and R-
LRP is the following.  The S-LRP is assumed to reflect activation related to evaluating 
the stimulus to a greater extent than activation related to preparing the response.  
Activation closer to the time of response-preparation/-execution is relatively smeared in 
the S-LRP, while activation closer to the time of perceiving/evaluating the stimulus is 
recorded with better fidelity.  In contrast, the R-LRP is assumed to reflect activation 
related to preparing and executing the response to a greater extent than activation related 
to evaluating the stimulus.  Activation closer to the time of perceiving/evaluating the 
stimulus is relatively smeared in the S-LRP, while activation closer to the time of 
response-preparation/-execution is recorded with better fidelity.  Furthermore, the 
interval between stimulus-onset and the onset of the S-LRP can be assumed to index the 
duration of pre-motoric processes leading to response-selection, while the interval 
between the onset of the R- LRP and the response is assumed to index the duration of 
subsequent motoric processes involved with response- preparation/execution (see also 
Coles et al., 1988; Gratton, 1998; Hackley, Schankin, Wohlschlager & Wascher, 2007; 
Masaki et al., 2000; Masaki et al., 2004).   
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 Following this logic, Keus and colleagues (2005) reasoned that if SNARC 
interference is localized at some stage after response-selection, perhaps during motoric 
response preparation, then there should be differences across SNARC-compatible and –
incompatible conditions in the R-LRP but not the S-LRP.  In contrast, observing 
SNARC-related effects in the S-LRP would indicate that SNARC interference is 
localized to an earlier stage, such as pre-motoric response-selection (see also Coles et al., 
1988; Gratton, 1998; Masaki et al., 2000; Masaki et al., 2004).  This reasoning 
exemplifies the use of ERP as “modern mental chronometry” (Meyer, Osman, Irwin & 
Yantis, 1988). 
 Behavior showed the SNARC effect, i.e., slower RTs for large-magnitude digits 
requiring a left-hand response compared to those requiring a right-hand response, with 
the reverse pattern for small-magnitude digits.  SNARC-compatible conditions elicited 
more negative S-LRPs compared to SNARC-incompatible conditions, approximately 300 
ms post-stimulus.  The authors characterized this result as indicating a pre-motoric 
response-selection locus for the SNARC effect.  However, some differences were 
observed in the R-LRPs as well.  SNARC-incompatible trials elicited greater negativity 
in the R-LRPs compared to SNARC-compatible trials.  However, regardless of SNARC-
compatibility, the R- LRPs showed negative deflections at approximately the same time 
point, 200 ms before response execution, indicating to the authors that SNARC-related 
interference had been “resolved” prior to the initiation of motoric response-preparation 
and -execution.   
    Gevers, Ratinckx and colleagues (2006) likewise examined S-LRP and R-LRP; 
as well as the non-lateralized P300 component.  The P300 is regarded as a neural 
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correlate of “context-updating” (Dien, Spencer & Donchin, 2004), perhaps also marking 
the termination of stimulus-evaluation processes, leading to a subsequent response-
selection stage (Coles, Gratton, Bashore, Eriksen & Donchin, 1985).   
 S- LRP onsets were delayed for SNARC-incompatible versus -compatible trials, 
suggesting that SNARC interference had effects at a relatively early response-selection 
stage.  Notably, initially positive “dips” in the S-LRP for SNARC-incompatible trials 
were observed, indicating activation of the incorrect response prior to choosing the 
correct one.  Such dips in the S-LRP have been taken to indicate “early communication” 
between stimulus-evaluation and response-selection systems in the brain (Coles et al., 
1988).  In contrast, R-LRPs were not significantly different between SNARC-
incompatible and -compatible trials, although SNARC-incompatible R-LRP also showed 
the positive “dip” reflecting pre-response activation of the incorrect response (Coles et 
al., 1988; Gevers, Ratinckx et al., 2006).  These results suggested again that SNARC 
interference arises and is resolved prior to response preparation/execution; locating 
response-selection as a potential boundary for the earliest stage that is likely to be 
affected by SNARC interference. 
 The non-lateralized P300 component did not differ between SNARC-compatible 
and SNARC-incompatible conditions.  This result suggested that SNARC effects were 
not operating as early as the conclusion of stimulus evaluation (Coles et al., 1985) or 
“context updating” (Dien et al., 2004).  The authors cautioned however that their null 
finding for the P300 could have reflected a general lack of sensitivity by this component 
for distinguishing neural events in intermediate processing stages.  Indeed, the P300 is 
subject to non-specific influences from multiple superimposed signals and there is not yet 
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any consensus concerning its functional significance (Coles et al., 1985; Dien et al., 
2004; Luck, 2005a).  Gevers, Ratinckx and colleagues (2006) concluded that SNARC 
interference was “not resolved at early perceptual stages” (p 66), but rather, at an 
intermediate stage of response-selection.  However, it should be noted that the P300 is 
viewed as a relatively late or intermediate component, when compared to e.g., truly early 
visual ERPs like P1 or N1 (Luck, 2005).    
 To summarize, previous ERP research tends to support the conclusion that 
SNARC effects are localized to an intermediate “response-selection stage” of mental 
information processing, which comes after perceptual/semantic stimulus evaluation 
processes (Gevers, Ratinckx et al., 2006), but before motoric response-preparation/-
execution processes (Gevers, Ratinckx et al., 2006; Keus et al, 2005).  Thus, SNARC 
interference is thought to arise and be resolved in a stage of central cognitive processing.  
However, it can be further asked “how unitary is this cognitive ‘response-selection 
stage’?”  One goal of the present research was to address this question.    
Theoretical Accounts of SNARC 
 Based on the evidence for pre-response activation of the incorrect response 
observed in LRPs, Gevers, Ratinckx and colleagues (2006) argued their findings were 
inconsistent with a “single-route” serial-stage architecture in which early 
sensory/perceptual and intermediate decision making processes must be completed before 
response-selection processes may begin (e.g., Sternberg, 1969; Sanders, 1980).  They 
favored instead a “dual-route” model of the SNARC effect, in which possible responses 
are activated in parallel, and competition for response-selection is gradually resolved, as 
evidence accumulates over time in favor of one response versus others.  This has been 
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implemented in a computational model (Gevers, Verguts, Reynvoet, Caessens & Fias, 
2006).   
 The “conditional” route relies on the output of a “verification stage” that evaluates 
possible responses against task goals (Kornblum et al., 1990).  The “unconditional” route 
is based on correspondences between stimulus- and response-sets (i.e., “dimensional 
overlap”; Kornblum et al., 1990).  Gevers, Ratinckx and colleagues (2006) attributed the 
LRP positive “dip” (indicating initial activation of the incorrect response) to response-
priming via this unconditional route.  According to this dual-route framework, the parity 
task with bimanual response introduces the issue of stimulus-response compatibility 
precisely because magnitude representations for the stimulus set possess dimensional 
overlap with representations of possible actions in the response set (Kornblum et al., 
1990).  The dimension of overlap between stimulus- and response sets in the parity task is 
thought to be spatially directed like a mental number line. 
 Similar to the dual-route model proposed by Gevers, Ratinckx and colleagues, a 
“continuous flow” model of information processing assumes that responses are activated 
throughout the stimulus evaluation process (Coles et al., 1985).  Similarly, an “affordance 
competition” framework (Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010) suggests that the brain 
continuously specifies response parameters of a range of possible actions in its 
continuous interactions with world.  Response competition for selection plays out within 
a network of fronto-parietal cortices and sub-cortical structures.  Evidence in favor of one 
action over others accumulates until a threshold is reached, whereupon the selected action 
is “released” for execution (Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010).     
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 It has been proposed that SNARC-related competition for response-selection 
arises “automatically” when making judgments about numerical information (Gevers, 
Ratinckx et al., 2006).  How might these “automatic” effects be modulated by 
communicating information about the likely response that is to be executed, in advance of 
the imperative stimulus?  Another goal of the present experiment was to address this 
question.  A recent ERP experiment introduced a suitable procedure for adapting to this 
question (Scheibe, Schubert, Sommer & Heekeren, 2009), discussed next.   
Response-Cuing and Prior Response-Probability 
 Scheibe and colleagues (2009) communicated advance information about the 
likely response to be executed in a number comparison task.  (However, their 
investigation was only incidentally concerned with numerical cognition and did not 
examine possible SNARC-related effects of S-R compatibility).  Scheibe and colleagues 
requested participants to judge which of two digits, presented bilaterally and sequentially, 
was the numerically larger one, by making a left or right key-press corresponding to the 
spatial location of the larger digit.   
 The digit presented first (D1) was selected from the set (1, 3, 5, 7, or 9), was 
presented either to the left or right of fixation, and remained visible until participants 
made their number comparison judgment following presentation of the second digit (D2).  
D2 was presented on the opposite side of fixation and was selected from the set (1-9, 
excluding the selected value of D1).  Therefore, D1 provided varying degrees of advance 
information during the D1-D2 interval concerning the likelihood that D2 would be the 
larger or smaller digit.  Given the location of D1, its magnitude indicated the probability 
that a left-hand (or right-hand) response would be required upon presentation of D2 
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[equal to .50 (when D1 was 5), .75 (when D1 was 3 or 7), or 1 (when D1 was 1 or 9)].  
This arrangement allowed comparisons among ERP correlates for response-selection 
when knowledge of the required response was of differing degrees of certainty in 
advance of the imperative stimulus.  Additionally within the case of intermediate 
uncertainty, comparisons were possible between responses to validly- and invalidly-cued 
responses, i.e., when P (Response | D1) = .75 and D2 ultimately required the more or less 
likely response, respectively.      
 Scheibe and colleagues (2009) found the LRP time-locked to D1 showed no 
activation during the D1-D2 interval unless the prior response-probability was equal to 1.  
The LRP time-locked to D2 showed more graded effects related to prior response-
probability given by D1.  Additionally, LRPs for invalidly-cued responses showed the 
positive “dip” typically characterizing initial pre-response activation of an incorrect 
response, noted earlier in connection with the SNARC effect (Gevers, Ratinckx et al., 
2006).  Questions about SNARC were not part of the investigation by Scheibe and 
colleagues, which were focused instead on examining preparation processes during a cue-
target interval (or “foreperiod).  Nevertheless, their experimental paradigm would seem 
suitable for addressing the question posed earlier: how would SNARC effects on 
response-selection, especially indicated by LRP, be modulated by communicating 
advance information about the likely response?         
 LRP effects related to prior response-probability (Scheibe et al., 2009) showed 
some clear similarities to LRP effects related to SNARC-compatibility, reviewed earlier 
(Gevers, Ratinckx et al., 2006; Keus et al., 2005).  Specifically, in the number 
comparison task the LRP time-locked to the imperative stimulus showed earlier 
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activation when prior response-probability was certainty, compared to when prior 
response-probability was lower (Scheibe et al., 2009).  Similarly, in the parity task the 
LRP time-locked to the imperative stimulus digit showed earlier activation when S-R 
mapping was SNARC-compatible versus –incompatible (Gevers, Ratinckx et al., 2006; 
Keus et al., 2005).  Additionally, “invalidly-cued” responses in the number comparison 
task and SNARC-incompatible S-R mapping in the parity task each resulted in pre-
response positive “dips” in the LRP, indicating initial activation of the incorrect response 
(Gevers, Ratinckx et al., 2006; Keus et al., 2005; Scheibe et al., 2009).  These analogous 
effects across separate investigations, showing the modulation of LRPs due to either 
SNARC-compatibility or prior response-probability, motivated the present investigation 
of how these factors would potentially combine in their effects on the LRP.   
Present Research (Experiment 1) 
 As reviewed above, SNARC-compatibility effects appear for response-selection.  
Similarly, prior response-probability effects appear for response-selection.  However, it 
remains unclear whether “response-selection” is best characterized as a unitary or 
multiple construct (Jennings & Van der Molen, 2005).  These observations raise the 
question: how (and when) will effects of prior-response probability and SNARC-
compatibility combine, especially in the LRP as an electrophysiological measure of 
response-selection?  Moreover, assuming that SNARC effects are triggered automatically 
as some have proposed (e.g., Gevers, Ratinckx et al., 2006), would SNARC effects be 
observed even when response-selection benefits from pre-cuing?  Experiment 1 
addressed these questions by examining LRPs.   
 Participants viewed numerical digits presented sequentially in the center of the 
screen and judged whether the second digit (D2) was larger or smaller than the first digit 
(D1) by making either left- or right-handed key-press.  D1 magnitude communicated the 
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prior probability of a given response, because participants were aware of the full set of 
digits which could be presented.  SNARC-compatibility was held constant within blocks 
of trials, and varied across blocks, so that S-R mapping was similarly a present feature of 
the task environment at the start of each trial.   
 One question of interest was therefore whether SNARC-compatibility would 
modulate the prior response-probability effect that was observed in the D1-D2 interval in 
the previous study by Scheibe and colleagues (2009).  Additionally, it was of interest to 
discover how SNARC-compatibility might combine with prior response-probability, 




METHOD EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 This chapter reports information about participants, materials and procedure, for 
behavioral tasks and electrophysiological recording in Experiment 1.  
Participants 
 25 volunteers (10 females) between the ages of 18 and 40 years (M = 21, SD = 
5.07) participated in the experiment and were compensated with pay or partial course 
credit.  All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  22 participants were 
right-handed by self-report.  The experiment was done with the approval of the 
Institutional Review Board of Georgia Institute of Technology.  Participants gave written 
informed consent.   
Procedure 
 The experimental session lasted approximately two hours including preparing 
participants for EEG recording and their subsequent performance of the experimental 
tasks.  Stimuli were presented and behavioral responses were recorded in experimental 
tasks presented by computer, programmed using e-prime software (Schneider, Eschman 
& Zuccolotto, 2002).  The experiment was performed in a dimly-lit and sound-attenuated 
booth.  The experimenter remained present during the experiment and monitored on-line 
EEG recordings, to admonish participants as needed to refrain from blinking, moving 
their eyes, or otherwise introducing signal artifacts by unnecessary movements during 
trials.  Participant head position was controlled by means of a chin-rest so that 
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participants viewed the experimental stimuli from a constant distance of approximately 
57 cm.    
 Trial sequences and stimuli are depicted in Figure 1.  Participants viewed two 
sequentially presented digits (D1, D2) presented centrally at fixation and then reported 
whether the second digit (D2) was smaller or larger than the first digit (D1) by making a 
left- or right-hand key-press.  Trials began with a fixation point for a variable amount of 
time between 500 - 600 ms (in steps of 20 ms), randomly selected on each trial.  The 
fixation point was a white dot against the black background.  Then the digit cue (D1) was 
presented centrally at fixation for 100 ms.  D1 was pseudo-randomly selected from the 
set (1, 3, 7, 9), with the constraint that each value for D1 was selected an equal number of 
times within blocks.  Digit stimuli were displayed approximately 1 cm in height and .5 
cm in width, subtending approximately 1º of visual angle with the participant’s head 
positioned approximately 57 cm from the stimulus.  The D1 cue was followed by a 
fixation point for 900 ms, and then the second digit (D2; the imperative stimulus) 
appeared for 100 ms, followed by a fixation point (for 2000 ms or until response).  
Values for D2 were pseudo-randomly selected from the set (1, 3, 7, 9), excluding the 
value selected for D1, and with the constraint that for each value of D1, each possible 








Figure 1.   Trial Sequence Experiment 1.  Participants reported whether the second digit 
(D2) was less than or greater than the first digit (D1) by responding with left- or right-
handed key-press.  “Validly cued” refers to the fact that when prior response-probability 
was equal to .66, the more likely response was required upon presentation of D2.  An 
“invalidly cued” trial in this case would have presented ‘1’ as D2.       
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 Participants performed the number comparison task in SNARC-compatible or 
SNARC-incompatible stimulus-response mapping conditions, in two distinct tasks within 
the experimental session, with task order counterbalanced across participants.  On each 
trial participants used the index fingers of left and right hands, to press respectively the 
‘Z’ or ‘N’ keys of a standard computer keyboard, to indicate whether D2 was larger (D2 
> D1) or smaller (D2 < D1) than D1.   
 Half the participants first performed 14 blocks (24 trials per block) in the SNARC-
compatible condition, responding with the index finger of the left hand when D2 < D1, 
and with the index finger of the right hand when D2 > D1, followed by 14 blocks (24 
trials per block) in the SNARC-incompatible condition, responding with the right index 
finger when D2 < D1, and with the left index finger when D2 > D1; Half the participants 
performed the tasks in the reverse order.  The first two blocks of each task were treated as 
practice blocks and those data were excluded from analyses.  Thus there were 288 trials 
in total in each SNARC-compatibility condition.    
 In the SNARC-compatible condition, the probability of a left-hand response when 
D1 = 1 was equal to zero, and the probability of a right-hand response was equal to 1.  
Conversely when D1 = 9 the probability of a left-hand response was equal to 1, and the 
probability of a right-hand response was equal to zero.  In contrast, in the SNARC-
incompatible condition, the probability of a left-hand response when D1 = 1 was equal to 
1, and the probability of a right-hand response was equal to zero.  Conversely when D1 = 
9 the probability of a left-hand response was equal to zero, and the probability of a right-
hand response was equal to 1.   
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 Prior response-probability given by D1 was orthogonally varied with SNARC 
stimulus-response compatibility.  In the SNARC-compatible condition, the probability of 
a left-hand response when D1 = 3 was equal to .33, and the probability of a right-hand 
response was equal to .66.  Conversely when D1 = 7 the probability of a left-hand 
response was equal to .66, and the probability of a right-hand response was equal to .33.  
In contrast, in the SNARC-incompatible condition, the probability of a left-hand response 
when D1 = 3 was equal to .66, and the probability of a right-hand response was equal to 
.33.  Conversely when D1 = 7 the probability of a left-hand response was equal to .33, 
and the probability of a right-hand response was equal to .66.   
 There were 144 trials in each SNARC-compatibility condition in which prior 
response-probability was equal to 1.  Likewise, there were 144 trials in each SNARC-
compatibility condition in which prior response-probability was equal to .66.  Of these, 
there were 96 trials in each SNARC-compatibility condition in which D2 was “validly 
cued” by D1.  This means that when prior response-probability was equal to .66, the more 
likely response was in fact required upon presentation of D2.  There were 48 trials in 
each SNARC-compatibility condition in which D2/response was invalidly cued by D1.  
This means that when prior response-probability was equal to .66, the less likely response 
turned out to be required upon presentation of D2.  [The nesting of “D1 response-cue-
validity” within the manipulation of prior response-probability entailed that separate 
analyses were required to examine SNARC-compatibility with 1) prior response-
probability and 2) D1 response-cue-validity.]       
 Participants viewed error messages for responding incorrectly, responding before 
presentation of D2, or failing to make a response.  Following the response for correct 
19 
 
trials, or the feedback for incorrect trials, the screen became blank for an inter-trial 
interval lasting 1300 to 1500 ms (in steps of 20 ms), randomly determined on each trial.  
Participants were instructed to withhold blinks, eye movements, and other unnecessary 
movements until the inter-trial interval.               
EEG Recording and Analysis 
 Electrophysiological data were recorded using a BioSemi Active-Two amplifier 
system (Amsterdam, Netherlands) and was digitized at 512 Hz.  Scalp potentials were 
recorded from 32 electrode sites: FP1/2, F7/8, F3/4, Fz, C3/4, Cz, P7/8, P3/4, Pz, T7/8, 
O1/2, Oz, AF3/4, FC1/2, CP1/2, PO3/4, FC5/6, and CP5/6.  Two additional electrodes 
will serve as reference and ground electrodes. These electrodes were the common mode 
sense (CMS) and driven right leg (DRL), respectively.  Vertical electrooculogram (EOG) 
was calculated offline as the difference between electrodes positioned above and below 
the left eye.  Horizontal EOG was calculated offline as the difference between electrodes 
positioned on the outer canthi of the left and right eyes.   
 EEG data were analyzed using BrainVision Analyzer (Brain Products, Gilching, 
Germany).  Offline, all channels were re-referenced to the algebraic average of the left 
and right mastoids.  Continuous EEG were digitally band-pass filtered from 0.1 to 30 Hz 
using a zero phase-shift Butterworth filter (12 dB/oct).  EEG were segmented into 1200 
ms segments beginning 200 ms pre-stimulus and continuing 1000 ms post-stimulus 
(either D1 or D2).  Segments were then baseline corrected by setting the average of the 
200 ms pre-stimulus baseline to zero.  An ocular correction method was used to remove 
artifacts due to horizontal eye movements (Gratton, Coles & Donchin, 1983).  
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Additionally, segments containing activity greater than ± 80 µV in the scalp and VEOG 
channels were considered artifacts and rejected.   
 LRPs were calculated and analyzed within two major time intervals during each 
trial, Post-D1 (averages time-locked to D1), and Post-D2 (averages time-locked to D2).  
When a left-hand movement was required, EEG/ERP activity from the ipsilateral C3 
electrode was subtracted from the activity recorded at the homologous contralateral C4 
electrode.  The analogous contralateral-minus-ipsilateral subtraction was carried out 
when a right-hand movement was required.  Finally, the contralateral-minus-ipsilateral 
subtractions for left- and right-hand conditions were averaged together to form the LRP 
for each condition.  (This procedure was done for all lateralized electrode pairs, but the 
pair C3/C4 was focused on for analyses of the LRP).  Mean area amplitudes (in µV) from 






RESULTS AND DISCUSSION EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 In this chapter behavioral results of Experiment 1 are reported first, then 
electrophysiological results.     
Behavioral Results 
 As noted, when prior response-probability was equal to .66, there was the 
possibility that D2 could be “invalidly-cued” by D1, i.e., the less likely response given 
D1 turned out to be the response that was required upon presentation of D2.  This nesting 
of “D1 response-cue-validity” within the manipulation of prior response-probability 
entailed separate analyses to examine effects of SNARC-compatibility in combination 
with those of 1) prior response-probability and 2) D1 response-cue-validity.  These are 
reported next in turn, with separate ANOVAs for response time (RT) and response 
accuracy.   
SNARC-Compatibility and Prior Response-Probability   
 A 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted, to examine effects of the 
independent variables SNARC-Compatibility (Compatible, Incompatible) and Prior 
Response-Probability (.66, 1) on Mean RT as the dependent variable.  Only correct trials 
were included.  Only trials in which D1 was a valid cue were included.  Results are 
depicted in Figure 2 (left panel).  The effects of SNARC-compatibility and Prior 
Response-Probability were each significant, F (1, 24) = 12.38, p =.002, ηp
2 
= .340, and F 
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(1, 24) = 98.84, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .805, respectively.  RTs were faster in SNARC-
Compatible versus SNARC-Incompatible conditions (M = 335.67, SE = 22.46, and M = 
392.81, SE = 27.44, respectively).  RTs were faster when Prior Response-Probability was 
equal to 1 versus when it was equal to .66 (M = 298.05, SE = 27.09, and M = 430.43, SE 
= 21.92, respectively).  However, these effects were qualified by their significant 
interaction, F (1, 24) = 6.04, p = .022, ηp
2 
= .201.  Post hoc analysis confirmed that the 
effect of SNARC-Compatibility on RT was larger when Prior Response-Probability was 
equal to .66 compared to when it was equal to 1 (M = 79.41, SE = 18.98, and M = 34.89, 
SE = 18.21, respectively), t (24) = 2.46, p = .022 (Md = 44.52, SEd = 18.11).   
 A 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to examine effects of the 
independent variables SNARC-Compatibility (Compatible, Incompatible) and Prior 
Response-Probability (.66, 1), on Mean Proportion-Correct Responses as the dependent 
variable.  Only trials in which D1 was a valid cue were included.  Results across 
conditions are depicted in Figure 2 (right panel).  The effect of SNARC-Compatibility 
was significant, F (1, 24) = 16.14, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .402.  Responses were more often 
correct in SNARC-Compatible versus SNARC-Incompatible conditions (M = .98, SE = 
.006, and M = .96, SE = .007, respectively).  The effect of Prior Response-Probability 
was not significant, F (1, 24) = 2.20, p = .151, ηp
2 
= .084.  The interaction was significant, 
F (1, 24) = 8.78, p = .007, ηp
2 
= .268.  Post hoc analysis confirmed that the effect of 
SNARC-Compatibility on Response Accuracy was larger when Prior Response-
Probability was equal to .66 compared to when it was equal to 1 (M = 0.03, SE = 0.01, 







Figure 2.  Behavioral Results SNARC and Prior-Response Probability.  Response time 
(left) and response accuracy (right) in Experiment 1, with the factors of SNARC-
compatibility and prior response-probability.  Legend: C means SNARC-compatible, IC 




 SNARC-Compatibility and Response Cue-Validity 
 As noted, the nesting of “D1 response-cue-validity” within the manipulation of 
prior response-probability entailed that separate analyses were required to examine 
effects of SNARC-compatibility with those of 1) prior response-probability and 2) D1 
response-cue-validity.  Therefore, a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted, to 
examine effects of the independent variables SNARC-Compatibility (Compatible, 
Incompatible) and Cue-Validity (Valid, Invalid) on Mean RT as the dependent variable.  
Only correct trials were included.  Only trials in which Prior Response-Probability was 
equal to .66 were included.  Results across conditions are depicted in Figure 3 (left 
panel).  The effects of SNARC-Compatibility and Cue-Validity were each significant, F 
(1, 24) = 20.27, p <.001, ηp
2 
= .458, and F (1, 24) = 17.77, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .425, 
respectively.  RTs were faster in SNARC-Compatible versus SNARC-Incompatible 
conditions (M = 401.79, SE = 19.79, and M = 485.54, SE = 26.09, respectively).  RTs 
were faster when the response was validly cued by D1 (M = 430.43, SE = 21.92, and M = 
456.90, SE = 20.95, respectively).  The interaction was not significant, F < 1.   
 A 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to examine effects of the 
independent variables SNARC-Compatibility (Compatible, Incompatible) and Cue-
Validity (Valid, Invalid), on Mean Proportion-Correct Responses as the dependent 
variable.  Only trials in which Prior Response-Probability was equal to .66 were included.  
Results across conditions are depicted in Figure 3 (right panel).  The effects of SNARC-
Compatibility and Cue-Validity were each significant, F (1, 24) = 15.06, p = .001, ηp
2 
= 
.386, and F (1, 24) = 9.94, p = .004, ηp
2 
= .293, respectively.  Responses were more often 
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correct in SNARC-Compatible versus SNARC-Incompatible conditions (M = .97, SE = 
.006, and M = .94, SE = .011, respectively).  Responses were more often correct when the 
response was validly cued by D1 (M = .97, SE = .006, and M = .95, SE = .009, 
respectively).   The interaction was not significant, F (1, 24) = 1.10, p = .304, ηp
2 








Figure 3.  Behavioral Results SNARC and Response-Cue-Validity.  Response time (left) 
and response accuracy (right) in Experiment 1, with the factors of SNARC-compatibility 




Discussion of Behavioral Results Experiment 1 
 Behavioral results were consistent with previous separate investigations of 
SNARC-compatibility and prior response-probability.  RTs were faster when stimulus-
response mapping was SNARC-compatible compared to when it was SNARC-
incompatible, and when prior response-probability was equal to 1 compared to when it 
was equal to .66.  These effects interacted such that the SNARC-compatibility effect was 
attenuated when prior response-probability was equal to 1, and was exacerbated when it 
was equal to .66.   
 Corresponding effects were observed for response accuracy.  Participants 
responded correctly more often when stimulus-response mapping was SNARC-
compatible compared to when it was SNARC-incompatible, and when prior response-
probability was equal to 1 compared to when it was equal to .66.   
 These effects interacted such that the SNARC-compatibility effect was attenuated 
when prior response-probability was equal to 1, and was exacerbated when it was equal 
to .66.  Moreover, responses were faster when the response was validly cued by D1 
compared to when it was invalidly cued.  Notably, SNARC-compatibility did not interact 
with D1 response-cue-validity in either RT or accuracy.  Overall, results for response 
accuracy do not provide evidence of speed-accuracy tradeoffs that would complicate 
interpretation of the RTs.       
 The interaction observed in RT between SNARC-compatibility and prior 
response-probability would suggest according to some cognitive psychology accounts 
that these factors therefore modulate the system at a common processing stage, most 
probably “response-selection.”  However, behavioral measures alone cannot show the 
dynamics of response-selection in real-time.  Therefore, electrophysiological data were 




 ERPs were examined in two broad time intervals – the interval between D1 and 
D2 (D1-D2) and the interval following the presentation of D2 (Post-D2), separately for 
each condition made up by the factorial combination of SNARC-Compatibility, Prior 
Response-Probability, and Cue-Validity.  As noted earlier, the nesting of “D1 response-
cue-validity” within the manipulation of prior response-probability entailed that separate 
analyses were required to examine effects of SNARC-compatibility with those of 1) prior 
response-probability and 2) D1 response-cue-validity.  Only correct trials were included.  
LRPs across conditions are shown in Figure 4, from -200 ms before D1 to 1800 ms after 
D1 to give a picture of activation continuously over the course of the trial.  For statistical 
analyses as well as visual presentation, LRPs were time-locked to either D1 (Figure 5), 
D2 (Figure 6), or the response (Figure 7).  For improved visualization, high-frequency 
noise was additionally removed from the data before graphing, using a low-pass filter set 







Figure 4.  LRP Time-Locked to D1.  LRPs time-locked to D1 across Experiment 1 
conditions, from -200 ms prior to D1 to +1800 ms after D1.  D1 onset = 0 ms, unit =100 
ms.  Legend: P1-c prior response-probability = 1/SNARC-compatible; P1-ic prior 
response-probability = 1/SNARC-incompatible; P6-vc prior response-probability = 
.66/validly-cued/SNARC-compatible; P6-vic prior response-probability = .66/validly-
cued/SNARC-incompatible; P6-ivc prior response-probability = .66/invalidly-









Figure 5.  LRPs recorded from C3/4 in the D1 – D2 Interval.  LRPs from the C3/4 
electrode pair across Experiment 1 conditions, from -200 ms before D1 until D2 onset 
(+1000 ms after D1).  D1 onset = 0 ms (dashed vertical line), unit = 100 ms.  The gray 
box indicates the time window in which mean LRP amplitudes were compared (800-1000 









Figure 6.  LRP Time-Locked to D2.  LRPs across Experiment 1 conditions, from -200 ms 
before D2 to +1000 ms after D2.  D2 onset = 0 ms (y-axis), unit = 100 ms. The gray 
boxes indicate the  three time windows in which mean area amplitudes were compared 
(0-200 ms post D2, 200-400 ms post-D2, and 400-600 ms post-D2).   Legend: As in 







Figure 7.  LRP Time-Locked to Response.  Response-locked LRPs across Experiment 1 
conditions, from -1000 ms before the response to +100 ms after the response.  Response 
= 0 ms (dashed vertical line), unit = 100 ms.  Waveforms were baseline-corrected during 
the time interval -1000 ms to -900 ms before response offset.  Box indicates time window 
(-300 to -100 ms) in which LRP slopes were computed for each individual for mean 





 Mean LRP amplitudes in the D1-D2 interval for the C3/4 electrode pair are shown 
in Figure 5 (see also Figure 8 for pre-subtraction waveforms).  The mean area LRP 
amplitude (µV) was examined in the D1-D2 interval in the smaller time interval 800 – 
1000 ms post-D1 (200 ms pre-D2).  This time interval was chosen based on previous 
research (Scheibe et al., 2009).  Noting that it was unknown to the participant at this point 
in the trial whether the required response would be validly-cued or invalidly-cued by D1, 
the analysis combined data from validly- and invalidly-cued trials when prior response-
probability was equal to .66.   
 A 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to examine effects of the 
independent variables SNARC-Compatibility (Compatible, Incompatible) and Prior 
Response-Probability (.66, 1) on mean area LRP amplitude, in the time interval 200 ms – 
0 ms before D2.  Only correct trials were included.  The main effect of SNARC-
Compatibility was not significant, F < 1.  The main effect of Prior Response-Probability 
was significant, F (1, 24) = 7.44, p = .012, ηp
2 
= .237.  Mean area amplitude was more 
negative when Prior Response-Probability was equal to 1 compared to when it was equal 
to .66 (M = -.38, SE = .17, and M = .23, SE = .13, respectively).  The interaction was not 
significant, F (1, 24) = 1.56, p = .224, ηp
2 
= .061.  Scalp distributions for pre-subtraction 
ERPs in this time window are shown in Figure 9.  Scalp distributions for post-subtraction 
ERPs in this time window are shown in Figure 10.   These show a strong frontal 
negativity slightly anterior to C3/C4 electrodes, only when prior response-probability was 
equal to 1, suggesting that advance response-cuing supported earlier selection of the 
correct response before the appearance of D2.  There is not a clear pattern of difference 
between scalp distributions for SNARC-compatible and –incompatible conditions, but 
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SNARC-compatible scalp distributions show a posterior positivity that is not present in 
SNARC-incompatible.   
 These results are consistent with those reported by Scheibe et al. (2009) and are 
straightforwardly understood as a result of providing complete versus partial advance 
information about the response to be required.  Notably, SNARC-compatibility did not 
show significant effects in the LRP observable before the appearance of D2, even though 
stimulus-response mapping was completely known to participants from the start of every 
trial.  This suggests a possible limitation for the claim that SNARC-induced response-
competition is an automatic outcome of processing numerical information or judging 
magnitude (e.g., Gevers, Ratinckx et al., 2006).  For example, if SNARC effects on 
response-selection were completely automatic, they might have been observable after the 
D1 response cue, even when prior response-probability was equal to 1, at the point when 
participants were able to initiate response-selection based on the information provided by 
the D1 cue alone.  However, this was not found.  Instead, SNARC effects were observed 
only subsequent to the appearance of the imperative stimulus D2 (shown in the following 
sections).  This might mean that that the mental number line concept became activated 
only when it was necessary to make a magnitude judgment about a presently appearing 
D2 stimulus, and not necessarily as soon as magnitude information is processed to 
interpret the D1 response-cue and anticipate the upcoming D2 stimulus.  
 Curiously, the LRP in the D1-D2 interval for trials in which the response was 
invalidly cued appeared positive-going, especially in the SNARC-Compatible condition 
(Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 8).  Mean area amplitude for this condition was 
significantly different from zero, t (24) = 2.64, p = .004 (M = .593, SE = .225), in the time 
interval examined in the preceding ANOVAs.  This result is somewhat paradoxical 
because participants would not have known prior to the appearance of D2 whether or not 
the response was validly cued.  It should have been expected rather, that LRPs for validly 
and invalidly cued responses in this time interval would have appeared much the same.  
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However, this anomaly might be explained as the spurious product of noise, noting that a 
maximum of 48 trials would have contributed to ERPs for trials in which responses were 
invalidly cued.  This number would have been further reduced due to incorrect responses 
(which were more frequent when responses were invalidly cued), as well as premature 
responses (or failure to make a response).  That the LRPs were relatively noisier for these 
conditions is evident by visual inspection.  Furthermore, the positive-going wave for 
invalidly cued responses did not reappear as a significant effect in the LRPs time-locked 
to D2, nor did it appear in the response-locked LRPs, at which points participants would 
have known whether the response had been validly or invalidly cued by D1.  The 
positive-going deflection in the waveforms is not clearly apparent in the scalp 
distributions either.  These considerations suggest that the positive-going LRPs in the D1-
D2 interval for invalidly cued trials may have been spurious.     
 On the other hand, even if this result is taken as face value as a “real” effect, there 
is no need to appeal to some sort of “precognition” (Bem, 2011) to explain it.  The 
participant did not know in the D1-D2 interval whether a given trial was validly or 
invalidly cued.  Nevertheless, the ERPs “know” this in their retrospective analyses.  
Invalidly cued trials were relatively rare, and the ERPs only reflect trials in which 
performance was correct (no errors or premature responses).  Error responses were more 
frequent in invalidly cued trials.  Thus the averages for invalidly cued trials are likely 
disproportionately influenced by a kind of “selection bias” that disproportionately 
highlights what was distinctive about correct performance.  These waveforms reflect 
what people were doing when they performed the task correctly.  A positive-going 
deflection in the LRP is usually taken to reflect early activation of the incorrect response, 
to be over-ridden later by cognitive control processes.  This interpretation is most often 
applied to LRPs time-locked to the imperative stimulus or to the response.  However, the 
present situation the positive-going deflection occurs in the LRP time-locked to the 
response pre-cue, and does not re-appear in later instantiations of the LRP (shown in 
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subsequent sections of this paper).  This might reflect early activation of the incorrect 
response that is later suppressed.  Alternatively, this might be interpreted here as 
reflecting an inhibitory mechanism for preventing premature responses in advance of the 
imperative stimulus D2.  It is likely that this mechanism would be disproportionately 
contributing to invalidly cued trials that were restricted to trials in which performance 
was correct.  In this light, the positive-going deflection in this time interval for invalidly 
cued trials may be more than a mere anomaly or spurious product of noise, but rather an 
unexpected finding meriting further exploration in future research—perhaps it is evidence 







Figure 8.  Pre-and Post-Subtraction Waveforms Time-Locked to D1.  C3/C4 electrodes.  
Red = Contralateral, Blue = Ipsilateral, and Black = Contralateral – Ipsilateral (the LRP).  
Time depicted on x-axis (-200 ms to +1000 ms post-D1 onset).  Voltage (µV) depicted on 
y-axis (range -6 to +6 for all panels).  D1 occurs at time 0 ms (y-axis crossing).  Unit = 
100 ms.  Boxes indicate time window 200 ms before D2, in which Prior Response-







Figure 9.  Pre- Subtraction Scalp Distributions Time-Locked to D1.  Scalp distributions 
across conditions 200 – 0 ms before D2 for pre-subtraction ERPs.  Contralateral and 
ipsilateral hemispheres are arbitrarily depicted on scalp maps respectively on the right 








Figure 10.  Post-Subtraction Scalp Distributions Time-Locked to D1.  Scalp distributions 
across conditions 200 – 0 ms before D2 for post-subtraction (contralateral minus 





 (See Figure 6; and for pre-subtraction waveforms, see Figure 11).  2 x 2 repeated-
measures ANOVAs were conducted to examine effects of the independent variables 
SNARC-Compatibility (Compatible, Incompatible) and Prior Response-Probability (.66, 
1) on mean area LRP amplitude (µV) after presentation of D2.  Within the broad “post-
D2” time range, LRPs were examined specifically during three shorter time intervals, 0 – 
200 ms, 200 – 400 ms, and 400 – 600 ms post-D2.  These time intervals were chosen to 
in order to examine the post-D2 LRPs during the time in which most behavioral RTs 
were observed, and to continue the interval scheme established in analysis of the D1-D2 
interval.  Furthermore, the time window 200 – 400 ms post-D2 was chosen to overlap 
with previous research, in which SNARC-related effects were observed in the LRP 
approximately 300 ms post-stimulus (Keus et al., 2005; Gevers, Ratinckx et al., 2006).  
 An omnibus ANOVA with Time Interval (0-200ms, 200 -400 ms, 400 -600ms) as 
a factor revealed significant interactions with SNARC-Compatibility, F (2, 23) = 8.19, p 
= .001, ηp
2 
= .254, and with Prior Response-Probability, F (2, 23) = 7.24, p = .002, ηp
2 
= 
.232.  ANOVAs were performed separately for each time interval to clarify these 
interactions.   The Time Interval factor did not interact with Cue-Validity, Fs < 1.  
However, for completeness and consistency, ANOVAs with the Cue-Validity factor were 
examined separately for each time interval as well.     
 As noted for the analyses of behavioral responses, the nesting of “D1 response-
cue-validity” within the manipulation of prior response-probability entailed that separate 
analyses were required to examine effects in the LRPs, of SNARC-compatibility in 
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combination with effects of 1) prior response-probability and 2) D1 response-cue-
validity.  Thus only trials in which D1 was a valid cue were included in analyses 
examining combined effects of SNARC-Compatibility and Prior Response-Probability.  
 Moreover, separate 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted to 
examine effects of the independent variables SNARC-Compatibility (Compatible, 
Incompatible) and Cue-Validity (Valid, Invalid) on mean area LRP amplitude after 
presentation of D2, separately during three time intervals, 0 – 200 ms, 200 – 400 ms, and 
400 – 600 ms post-D2.  Only trials in which Prior Response-Probability was equal to .66 
were included in analyses examining combined effects of SNARC-Compatibility and 
Cue-Validity.  The separate ANOVAs including SNARC-compatibility in combination 
with effects of 1) prior response-probability and 2) D1 response-cue-validity are reported 
in turn in successive paragraphs, within each section treating the analyses of the separate 
post-D2 sub-intervals (0 – 200 ms, 200 – 400 ms, and 400 – 600 ms post-D2). 
0 – 200 ms  
 In the ANOVA examining SNARC-Compatibility in combination with Prior 
Response-Probability, the main effect of SNARC-Compatibility was not significant, F (1, 
24) = 1.38, p =.252, ηp
2 
= .054.  The main effect of Prior Response-Probability was not 
significant, F < 1.  The interaction was not significant, F (1, 24) = 2.20, p = .151, ηp
2 
= 
.084.   
 In the ANOVA examining SNARC-Compatibility in combination with Cue-
Validity, the main effect of SNARC-Compatibility was not significant, F (1, 24) = 2.75, p 
=.110, ηp
2 
= .103.  The main effect of Cue-Validity was not significant, F < 1.  The 
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interaction of SNARC-compatibility and Cue-Validity was not significant, F (1, 24) = 
3.32, p = .080, ηp
2 
= .122.    
200 – 400 ms  
 In the ANOVA examining SNARC-Compatibility in combination with Prior 
Response-Probability, the main effect of SNARC-Compatibility was significant, F (1, 24) 
= 5.22, p =.031, ηp
2 
= .179.  Mean area amplitude was more negative when stimulus-
response mapping was SNARC-Compatible compared to when it was SNARC-
Incompatible (M = -1.04, SE = .21, and M = -0.62, SE = .13, respectively).  The main 
effect of Prior Response-Probability was not significant, F (1, 24) = 2.81, p =.107, ηp
2 
= 
.105.  The interaction was not significant, F < 1.   
 LRPs in the 200 – 400 ms interval following the appearance of D2 showed effects 
of SNARC-compatibility but not of prior response-probability.  LRPs were more negative 
in the SNARC-compatible versus SNARC-incompatible conditions.  This result is very 
consistent with a previous finding by Keus and colleagues (2005) using a parity judgment 
task, in which the stimulus-locked LRP was more negative for SNARC-compatible 
versus –incompatible trials, approximately 300 ms post-stimulus.  Therefore the present 
result confirms previous findings showing that SNARC interference arises at intermediate 
processing stages that are probably related to response-selection.  Here, this result might 
also suggest that SNARC-incompatibility exerted residual inhibiting effects on response-
selection after the appearance of D2, regardless of prior response-selection afforded by 
response-cuing.  Alternatively, this might mean that that interference due to the mental 
number line concept became activated only when it was necessary to make a magnitude 
judgment about a presently appearing D2 stimulus, and not necessarily as soon as 
magnitude information was processed to interpret the D1 response-cue and anticipate the 
upcoming D2 stimulus.   
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 In the ANOVA examining SNARC-Compatibility in combination with Cue-
Validity, the main effect of SNARC-Compatibility was not significant, F (1, 24) = 1.00, p 
= .326, ηp
2 
= .040.  The main effect of Cue-Validity was significant, F (1, 24) = 13.03, p 
=.001, ηp
2 
= .352.  Mean area amplitude was more negative when the response was 
validly cued compared to when it was invalidly cued by D1 (M = -1.20, SE = .19, and M 
= -0.66, SE = .17, respectively).  The interaction of SNARC-compatibility and Cue-
Validity was not significant, F (1, 24) = 2.50, p = .127, ηp
2 
= .094.   
 An effect of D1 response-cue validity was also observed in this interval, in which 
LRPs were more negative when the response was validly- versus invalidly-cued by D1.  
This straightforwardly illustrates greater facilitation of the correct response when events 
indeed occurred as expected.   Scalp distributions for pre-subtraction ERPs in this time 
window are depicted in Figure 12.   These show that there is a strong posterior positivity, 
probably related to the P300 component, for all conditions except when prior response-
probability was equal to 1 and stimulus-response mapping was SNARC-incompatible, in 
which it is weaker but still very much present.  Also, the LRP is nicely visible here as the 
asymmetry in the plot around the C3/4 electrode pair.  Scalp distributions for post-
subtraction waveforms are depicted in Figure 13.  These very clearly show greater 
frontal-central negativity in SNARC-compatible conditions.  Also, the maximal 
negativities appear somewhat anterior to C3/C4 electrodes when prior response-
probability was equal to .66.     
   








Figure 11.  Pre- and Post-Subtraction Waveforms Time-Locked to D2.  C3/C4 
electrodes.  Red = Contralateral, Blue = Ipsilateral, and Black = Contralateral – Ipsilateral 
(the LRP).  Time depicted on x-axis (-200 ms to +1000 ms post-D2 onset).  Voltage (µV) 
depicted on y-axis (range -12 to +12 for all panels).  D2 occurs at time 0 ms (y-axis 
crossing).  Unit = 100 ms.  Boxes indicate time window 200 – 400 ms post-D2, in which 






Figure 12.  Pre-Subtraction Scalp Distributions 200 – 400 ms Post -D2.  Scalp 
distributions across conditions 200 – 400 ms post-D2 for pre-subtraction ERPs.  
Contralateral and ipsilateral hemispheres are arbitrarily depicted on scalp maps 







Figure 13.  Post-Subtraction Scalp Distributions 200 – 400 ms Post -D2.  Scalp 
distributions across conditions 200 – 400 ms post-D2 for post-subtraction (contralateral 
minus ipsilateral) ERPs.  The left side of the head is depicted arbitrarily.    
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400 – 600 ms  
 In the ANOVA examining SNARC-Compatibility in combination with Prior 
Response-Probability, the main effect of SNARC-Compatibility was not significant, F < 
1.  The main effect of Prior Response-Probability was not significant, F (1, 24) = 3.25, p 
= .084, ηp
2 
= .119.  The interaction was significant, F (1, 24) = 6.20, p = .020, ηp
2 
= .205.  
Post-hoc analysis showed that mean area amplitude was more negative when stimulus-
response mapping was SNARC-Incompatible versus SNARC-Compatible, when Prior 
Response-Probability was equal to .66 (M = -1.07, SE = .34, and M = -.23, SE = .26, 
respectively), t (24) = -3.21, p = .008 (Md = -.85, SEd = .26).  In contrast, mean area 
amplitude did not differ between SNARC-Incompatible and SNARC-Compatible 
conditions when Prior Response-Probability was equal to 1 (M = -.47, SE = .18, and M = 
-.82, SE = .18, respectively), t (24) = 1.20, p = .480 (Md = .34, SEd = .29).  Visually 
inspecting the Figures 6 and 11, the LRP time-locked to D2 appeared to resolve into a 
clear peak in SNARC-compatible conditions when prior response-probability was equal 
to .66, but not so in SNARC-incompatible conditions.  This might also reflect 
competition for response-selection related to SNARC interference, especially in a 
condition in which there was greater uncertainty in advance of the imperative stimulus 
D2.    
 In the ANOVA examining SNARC-Compatibility in combination with Cue-
Validity, the main effect of SNARC-Compatibility was not significant, F < 1.  The main 
effect of Cue-Validity was not significant, F (1, 24) = 2.48, p =.129, ηp
2 
= .094.  The 
interaction was significant, F (1, 24) = 4.79, p = .039, ηp
2 
= .166.  Post-hoc analysis 
showed that mean area amplitude was more negative when stimulus-response mapping 
was SNARC-Incompatible versus SNARC-Compatible, when the response was validly 
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cued by D1 (M = -1.07, SE = .33, and M = -.22, SE = .25, respectively), t (24) = -3.21, p 
= .008 (Md = -.85, SEd = .26).  In contrast, mean area amplitude did not differ between 
SNARC-Incompatible and SNARC-Compatible conditions when D2 was invalidly cued 
by D1 (M = -.55, SE = .33, and M = -.25, SE = .26, respectively), t (24) = .83, p = .830 
(Md = .30, SEd = .36).   
 In the interval 400 – 600 ms after the appearance of the imperative stimulus D2, 
an interaction of SNARC-compatibility and prior response-probability was observed in 
the LRP time-locked to D2.  When prior response-probability was equal to .66, LRPs 
were more negative when stimulus-response mapping was SNARC-incompatible versus -
compatible; but did not differ across SNARC-compatibility conditions when prior 
response-probability was equal to 1.  Likewise, in the same interval an interaction of 
SNARC-compatibility and response-cue-validity was observed in the LRP.  LRPs were 
more negative when stimulus-response mapping was SNARC-incompatible versus 
compatible, when the response was validly-cued by D1.  These interacting effects 
appearing late in the stimulus-locked LRPs are complex to interpret, and are likely related 
to an earlier LRP onset for trials when D1 response-cues gave complete information 
about the upcoming D2/response.   
 Scalp distributions for pre-subtraction ERPs in this time window are depicted in 
Figure 14.   These show further strengthening of the posterior positivity, possibly related 
to the P300 component.  The difference between prior response-probability conditions is 
evident here, reflecting the fact that there was more uncertainty to resolve in when prior 
response-probability was less than certain, resulting in a bigger P300 regardless of 
response-cue-validity.   
 Scalp distributions for post-subtraction waveforms are depicted in Figure 15.  
These show a complex pattern of distributions across conditions.  Maximal negativities 
appear by this time interval to be posterior to C3/C3 electrodes when prior response-
probability was equal to 1.  In contrast, maximal negativities appear more frontally when 
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prior response-probability was equal to .66, with strong posterior positive maxima 
appearing as well, especially in SNARC-compatible conditions.  Thus, when viewed 
together as a sequence, the post-subtraction scalp maps from -200 ms before D2 to +600 
ms after D2 show a clear anterior-posterior transition for maximal negativities when 
response pre-cuing provided complete advance information about the correct response.  
When advance information was less certain, maximal negativities appeared later and had 







Figure 14.  Pre-Subtraction Scalp Distributions 400 – 600 ms Post -D2.  Scalp 
distributions across conditions 400 - 600 ms post-D2 for pre-subtraction ERPs.  
Contralateral and ipsilateral hemispheres are arbitrarily depicted on scalp maps 






Figure 15.  Post-Subtraction Scalp Distributions 400 – 600 ms Post -D2.  Scalp 
distributions across conditions 400 – 600 ms post-D2 for post-subtraction (contralateral 





 (See Figure 7; and for pre-subtraction waveforms, see Figure 16).  To further 
clarify the time course of effects on response-selection and –execution in the interval 
after D2, LRPs were examined as time-locked to the response.  Data were segmented into 
intervals from -1000 ms before the response to +100 ms after the response.  Following 
previous research (Scheibe et al., 2006), the time interval -1000 ms to -900 ms before 
response offset was chosen as the baseline period.     
Amplitude 
 Mean area amplitude was examined for the response-locked LRP in the time 
interval -200 ms to 0 ms preceding the response.  In the ANOVA examining SNARC-
Compatibility in combination with Prior Response-Probability, the main effect of 
SNARC-Compatibility was not significant, F (1, 24) = 1.64, p = .213, ηp
2 
= .064.  The 
main effect of Prior Response-Probability was not significant, F < 1.  The interaction was 
not significant, F (1, 24) = 2.88, p = .102, ηp
2 
= .107.  These results mean that expectancy 
and SNARC interference were not effective for amplitude during late response-execution 
phases of performance. 
 In the ANOVA examining SNARC-Compatibility in combination with Cue-
Validity, the main effect of SNARC-Compatibility was not significant, Fs < 1.  The main 
effect of Cue-Validity was significant F (1, 24) = 6.23, p = .020, ηp
2 
= .206.  Mean area 
amplitude was more negative when responses were validly cued compared to when they 
were invalidly cued (-1.573 versus -.841, respectively).  The interaction was not 
significant, F (1, 24) = 2.51, p = .126, ηp
2 
= .095.  These results meant that when prior 
expectancy was violated, by the appearance of the less likely D2, late response-execution 
processes were inhibited, as reflected in amplitude differences. 
 The waveform for SNARC-incompatible trials in which responses were invalidly 
cued suggests a positive-going wave preceding the response-locked LRP, which could 
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mean initial activation of the incorrect response.  However, although positive, mean area 
amplitude for this condition in the time interval -500 ms to -300 ms preceding the 
response was not significantly different from zero, t (24) = 1.46, p = .146 (M = .5102, SE 
= .348).   
 Response-locked LRPs did not show SNARC effects in amplitude.  This is 
consistent with previous research showing that SNARC interference is resolved prior to 
motoric response-execution (Gevers, Ratinckx et al., 2006; Keus et al., 2005).  Though 
visible to inspection, the positive deflection for invalidly cued trials was not significantly 
different from zero in the response-locked LRPs.  Participants would have known at this 
point in the trial whether expectations that had been established by the D1 cue were 
confirmed or violated by the imperative stimulus D2.  That the signal-to-noise ratio was 
weaker for ERPs during invalidly cued trials is evident to inspection and is directly 
attributable to the relative rarity of such trials.    
Slope 
 LRP slopes (µV/ms) were examined, to serve as indices of the rate of lateralized 
activation build-up in favor of the correct response.  The LRP slopes in the interval from 
-300 to -100 ms before the response were calculated by fitting regression lines to the data 
for each individual.  Scalp distributions for pre-subtraction ERPs in this time window are 
depicted in Figure 13.  Average LRP slopes in this interval were compared in ANOVAs.   
 Scalp distributions for pre-subtraction waveforms for ERPs time-locked to the 
response, for the time window in which LRP slopes were computed, are shown in Figure 
17.  These show increasing posterior positivity when prior response-probability was equal 
to .66.  Scalp distributions for post-subtraction waveforms for ERPs time-locked to the 
response, for the same time window, are shown in Figure 18.  These show maximal 
difference negativities over C3/C4 electrodes, somewhat indistinguishably across 
conditions except when responses were invalidly cued and stimulus-response mapping 
was SNARC-incompatible.     
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 In the ANOVA examining SNARC-Compatibility in combination with Prior 
Response-Probability, the main effect of SNARC-Compatibility was not significant, F < 
1.  The main effect of Prior Response-Probability was significant, F (1, 24) = 7.61, p = 
.011, ηp
2 
= .241.  The mean LRP slope was steeper (more negative) when Prior Response-
Probability was equal to .66 compared to when it was equal to 1 (-.009 versus -.005, 
respectively).  The interaction was not significant, F (1, 24) = 3.71, p = .066, ηp
2 
= .134.  
Mean slopes across these factors are presented in Figure 19.  These results suggest a 
faster build-up of activation in favor of the correct response when prior response-
probability was equal to .66.  This is likely related to a later initiation of response-
selection in these conditions, necessitating a faster response-execution to maintain a 
relatively constant rate of responding overall.   
 In the ANOVA examining SNARC-Compatibility in combination with Cue-
Validity, neither the main effects of SNARC-Compatibility nor Cue-Validity, nor the 
interaction, were significant, Fs < 1.  These results mean that response-cue-validity did 
not affect the rate of activation build-up for late response-execution, even when responses 
were invalidly cued.    
 The LRPs time-locked to responses did not show SNARC effects, which is 
consistent with the limited amount of previous ERP research into SNARC (Gevers, 
Ratinckx et al., 2006; Keus et al., 2005).  Notably, the effect of prior response-probability 
was evident at even this late stage of response-related processing.  LRP slopes, obtained 
for each individual, were on average steeper (more negative) when prior response-
probability was equal to .66 versus when it was equal to 1.  This result can be interpreted 
by noting that participants in RT experiments generally try to maintain a relatively 
constant rate of responding overall (Laming, 1979).  This fact suggests that when 
complete information about the upcoming response was provided in advance, responses 
could be executed “more leisurely” when response-selection had been mostly 
accomplished earlier; and that when response-selection was delayed by reduced advance 
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information, response-execution was more rapidly performed to maintain a relatively 







Figure 16.  Pre- and Post-Subtraction Waveforms Time-Locked to Response.  C3/C4 
electrodes.  Red = Contralateral, Blue = Ipsilateral, and Black = Contralateral – Ipsilateral 
(the LRP).   Time depicted on x-axis (-1000 ms before response offset, indicated by 
arrow in upper left panel, to +100 after).  Time unit = 100 ms.  Voltage (µV) depicted on 
y-axis (range -6 to +6 for all panels).  Boxes indicate time window (-300 to – 100 ms) 






Figure 17.  Pre-Subtraction Scalp Distributions Time-Locked to Response.  Scalp 
distributions across conditions for pre-subtraction ERPs time-locked to response, in the 
indicate -300 to – 100 ms time window in which individual slopes were fitted for 
comparisons.  Contralateral and ipsilateral hemispheres are arbitrarily depicted on scalp 








Figure 18.  Post-Subtraction Scalp Distributions Time-Locked to Response.  Scalp 
distributions across conditions of  post-subtraction (contralateral minus ipsilateral) ERPs 
time-locked to the response, in the time window in which LRP slopes were computed.  






Figure 19.  Mean Slopes for LRPs Time-Locked to Response.  Mean slopes across 
conditions for response-locked LRPs in time interval -300 to -100 ms before response 
termination.  White columns = SNARC-Compatible (C), Gray columns = SNARC-
Incompatible (IC).  Prior Response-Probability represented on x-axis.  Slopes were 
significantly steeper when Prior Response-Probability was equal to .66. 
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Correlations between LRP Slopes and Behavioral RTs 
 To investigate whether LRP slopes were functionally meaningful, correlation with 
behavioral RTs were examined.  Notably, LRP slopes when Prior Response-Probability 
was equal to .66 were significantly correlated with behavioral RTs in some conditions.  
Specifically, steeper (more negative) LRP slopes when responses were validly cued 
(SNARC-compatible) were predictive of faster RTs in the same condition, r = .403, p = 
.046.  Furthermore, steeper (more negative) LRP slopes when responses were invalidly 
cued (SNARC-Compatible) were predictive of faster RTs in the same condition, r = .444, 
p = .026. Additionally, steeper (more negative) LRP slopes when responses were validly 
cued (SNARC-Compatible) were predictive of faster RTs when Prior Response-
Probability was equal to 1 (SNARC-Compatible), r = .524, p = .007.  Additionally, faster 
RTs when Prior Response-Probability was equal to 1 (SNARC-Compatible), were 
associated with steeper (more negative) LRP slopes when responses were invalidly cued 
(SNARC-Incompatible), r = .406, p = .044.  Scatterplots depicting these significant 
correlations between LRP slope and RT variables are presented in Figure 20.  These 
results mean that LRP slopes were functionally meaningful and related to behavioral 
performance.     
 No other significant relationships between LRP slopes and RTs were observed, 
although RTs across all conditions were significantly and positively associated amongst 
each other (rs ranging from .597 to .928, ps < .05), suggesting there was sufficient 
systematic variance in RTs to yield significant correlations across conditions.  For 
comparison purposes, a scatterplot depicting an example non-significant correlation 
between LRP slope and RT variables is presented in Figure 21.  This demonstrates that 
the failure to observe significant correlation in this case was not due to a lack of variance 
in one variable or the other per se; but rather, was due to a lack of systematic variance 
shared between variables.  
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 That the LRP slopes were functionally meaningful is supported by significant 
correlations with the behavioral RTs, specifically in SNARC-compatible conditions.  In 
light of the fact that no significant SNARC effects were observed for LRP slopes when 
averaged over individuals, it is intriguing that LRP slopes shared significant systematic 
variance with RTs only in SNARC-compatible conditions.  This result suggests the 
possibility of hitherto unobserved SNARC effects on relatively late response-execution 
processes, observable here at the level of individual differences, which may have been 
obscured in previous investigations that examined data only at the group level. 
 





Figure 20.  Scatterplots: LRP Slopes Predicting RTs.  Slopes for response-locked LRPs 
(x-axis) predicting RTs (y-axis).  Upper Left: LRP slopes Prior Response-Probability = 
.66 responses validly cued (SNARC-Compatible), predicting RTs in same condition.  
Upper Right: LRP slopes Prior Response-Probability = .66 responses invalidly cued 
(SNARC-Compatible), predicting RTs in same condition.  Lower Left:  LRP slopes Prior 
Response-Probability = .66 responses validly cued (SNARC-Compatible), predicting RTs 
Prior Response-Probability = 1 (SNARC-Compatible).  Lower Right: LRP slopes Prior 
Response-Probability = .66 responses invalidly cued (SNARC-Incompatible), predicting 








Figure 21.  Scatterplots: Example Non-Significant Correlation between LRP Slopes and 
RTs.  Example of non-significant relationship between slopes for response-locked LRPs 
(x-axis) and RTs (y-axis).  LRP slopes Prior Response-Probability = .66 responses 




 To further clarify neural responses in the Post-D2 interval, mean area amplitude 
for the non-lateralized ERP was examined at a posterior central electrode (Pz), in the time 
window 300 – 600 ms post-D2 onset, corresponding to the P300 component.  (See Figure 
22).   
 In the ANOVA examining SNARC-Compatibility in combination with Prior 
Response-Probability, the main effect s of SNARC-Compatibility and Prior Response-
Probability were each significant , F (1, 24) = 10.38, p = .004, ηp
2 
= .302., and F (1, 24) = 
54.71, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .695, respectively.  Mean area amplitude was more positive in 
SNARC-Compatible versus SNARC–Incompatible conditions (7.26 versus 6.14, 
respectively), and when Prior Response-Probability was equal to .66 versus when equal 
to 1 (8.68 versus 4.71, respectively).  The interaction was not significant, F (1, 24) = 
1.02, p = .320, ηp
2 
= .041.     
 In the ANOVA examining SNARC-Compatibility in combination with Cue-
Validity, the main effect s of SNARC-Compatibility and Cue-Validity were each 
significant, F (1, 24) = 6.45, p = .018, ηp
2 
= .212, and F (1, 24) = 38.11, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 
.614, respectively.  Mean area amplitude was more positive when responses were 
invalidly cued versus validly cued (10.96 versus 8.67, respectively).  The interaction was 
not significant, F (1, 24) = 3.26, p = .084, ηp
2 
= .120.  
 The non-lateralized P300 component showed effects of prior response-
probability, response-cue-validity, and also (surprisingly) SNARC-compatibility.  The 
effects of Prior Response-Probability and Cue-Validity on the P300 are relatively 
straightforward to interpret.  When the D1 cue gave complete information about the 
magnitude of the upcoming D2, there was little “context updating” to do when D2 
eventually appeared.  This was reflected as a relatively flat but positive waveform.  In 
contrast, when the D1 cue gave only partial information about the magnitude of the 
upcoming D2, there was indeed much “context updating” to do when D2 eventually 
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appeared.  This was reflected as a more positive waveform with a clear peak.  This was 
especially the case when expectations that had been established by D1 were ultimately 
violated by D2, i.e., when responses were invalidly cued by D1 magnitude (e.g., D1 = 7, 
D2 = 9).  (Note too that the P300 is sensitive to stimulus frequencies, which can also 
explain the higher amplitudes evoked by invalidly cued D2 stimuli, i.e., events that were 
relatively rare).  These results suggest parietal involvement in representing prior 
response-probability, or expressed in more psychological terms, “expectancy.”   
 The experiment produced the novel finding that P300 amplitude was more 
positive in SNARC-compatible versus –incompatible conditions.  The P300 results in the 
present work show that SNARC interference resulted in a reduced cortical response 
overall to the imperative stimulus D2, regardless of stimulus frequencies or expectations 
established by D1 magnitude.   
 It is likely that the discrepancy between findings is related to the difference in 
how SNARC-compatibility was manipulated.  In the number parity task used by Gevers, 
Ratinckx and colleagues (2006), SNARC-compatibility was varied trial-by-trial, whereas 
in the number comparison task used in the present experiment, SNARC-compatibility 
was necessarily varied across blocks of trials.  That the P300 amplitude was functionally 
meaningful in the present experiment is supported by the fact that P300 amplitudes were 
predictive of behavioral RTs.      
 Notably, the time interval in which the SNARC effect was detected for the P300 
was largely overlapping with the intervals in which the SNARC effect was observed for 
the LRP (time-locked to D2).  Qualitatively, changes in amplitude for the P300 across 
conditions appear to correspond with changes in amplitude for the pre-subtraction 
waveforms contributing to the LRPs.  This suggests the possibility that amplitude for the 
pre-subtraction waveforms contributing to the LRPs may have been partly influenced by 
P300 amplitude (although the degree of ERP lateralization reflected in the post-
subtraction LRP waveforms would have been independent of this influence).  However, 
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there were no significant correlations between amplitudes for P300 and the pre-
subtraction waveforms contributing to the LRPs, suggesting that this relationship is only 
qualitatively apparent in the group averages and did not hold at the individual level.     
 Nonetheless, the SNARC effect on P300 amplitude, and the scalp distributions for 
pre-subtraction ERPs contributing to the LRPs, might be taken as evidence for parietal 
contributions to the SNARC effect on response-selection (Hubbard et al., 2005).  The 
P300 SNARC effect suggests moreover that there was “early communication” between 
response-selection and stimulus-evaluation processes, as in a “continuous flow” model of 
cognitive control (Coles et al., 1988).  It might be conjectured from this evidence that a 
“mental load” was imposed on participants by maintaining in working memory a 
relatively counterintuitive stimulus-response mapping throughout the task, which was 
reflected as a weaker cortical response overall to the imperative stimulus D2 in SNARC-
incompatible conditions.   
Correlations between P300 Amplitudes and Behavioral RTs 
 To investigate whether P300 amplitudes were functionally meaningful, 
correlations with behavioral RTs were examined.  Notably, P300 amplitudes when Prior 
Response-Probability was equal to 1 were correlated with behavioral RTs in some 
conditions.  In SNARC-Compatible conditions higher P300 amplitudes predicted faster 
RTs when Prior Response-Probability was equal to 1 (SNARC-Incompatible), r = -.427, 
p = .033; and when Prior Response-Probability was equal to .66 and responses were 
invalidly cued (SNARC-Compatible), r = -.412, p = .041.  In SNARC-Incompatible 
conditions higher P300 amplitudes predicted faster RTs when Prior Response Probability 
was equal to 1 (SNARC-Incompatible), r = -.537, p = .006; and when Prior Response-
Probability was equal to .66 and responses were invalidly cued (SNARC-Compatible), r 
= -.399, p = .048.   
 Scatterplots depicting these significant correlations between P300 and RT 
variables are presented in Figure 23.  No other significant relationships between P300 
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amplitudes and RTs were observed.  Moreover, there were no significant relationships 
between LRP slopes and P300 amplitudes across conditions (ps > .05).  Neither were 
there any significant correlations between amplitudes for P300 and for pre-subtraction 
ERPs contributing to LRPs in the overlapping time window (200 – 400 ms post-D2) in 
which the SNARC effect was significant for the LRP (ps > .05).   
 That P300 amplitudes were functionally meaningful is shown by significant 
correlations with behavioral RTs in some conditions.  Higher P300 amplitudes were 
associated with faster RTs, suggesting that increased cortical response to imperative 
stimulus D2 was associated with faster stimulus evaluation and response-selection.  
Results suggest that maintaining a counterintuitive stimulus-response mapping in 
working memory imposed a “mental load” which reduced cortical activity devoted to 
processing the imperative stimulus D2 in SNARC-incompatible conditions, leading to 
slower decision making reflected as RTs.    
 
 








Figure 22.  P300 ERP Time-Locked to D2.  P300 ERP evoked by D2 stimulus at Pz 
electrode.  Box indicates time window in which mean area amplitude was compared 
across conditions.   








Figure 23.  Scatterplots: P300 Amplitude Predicting RTs.  P300 amplitude (x-axis) 
predicting RTs (y-axis).  Upper Left:  P300 amplitude Prior Response-Probability = 1 
(SNARC-Compatible), predicting RTs Prior Response-Probability = 1 (SNARC-
Incompatible).  Upper Right:  P300 amplitude Prior Response-Probability = 1 (SNARC-
Compatible), predicting RTs Prior Response-Probability = .66 responses invalidly cued 
(SNARC-Compatible).  Lower Left: P300 amplitude Prior Response-Probability = 1 
(SNARC-Incompatible), predicting RTs Prior Response-Probability = 1 (SNARC-
Incompatible).  Lower Right: P300 amplitude Prior Response-Probability = 1 (SNARC-
Incompatible), predicting RTs Prior Response-Probability = .66 responses invalidly cued 





Summary and Discussion ERP Results Experiment 1 
 In sum, the present LRP results are overall consistent with conclusions from the 
limited number of previous ERP studies of SNARC effects.  Moreover, the present work 
generalizes from ERP investigations of SNARC in the number parity task to the number 
comparison task.  Specifically, present results are in agreement with the conclusion that 
SNARC interference arises and is resolved during intermediate processing stages related 
to pre-motoric response-selection.  However, the SNARC effect on the P300 in the 
present work diverges somewhat from the results of a previous experiment in which 
SNARC-compatibility was varied trial-by-trial (Gevers, Ratinckx et al., 2006), and in 
which no SNARC effect was observed for the P300.  Thus, the present work also 
contributes a novel finding to the literature as well as confirmatory ones.  The reduced 
P300 in SNARC-incompatible conditions is suggestive of a parietal source for the 
SNARC effect, and is provisionally interpreted here as reflecting a reduced cortical 
response to the imperative stimulus number when a counterintuitive stimulus-response 
mapping needed to be maintained in working memory over the course of performing the 
comparison task.  In the following section, and existing theory of the SNARC effect, 
which can be applied to “conflict tasks” more generally, is modified and applied in a 
qualitative manner to give a possible account of the present behavioral and ERP findings.   
Dual-Route Model of the SNARC Effect 
 In the dual-route model of the SNARC effect (Gevers, Ratinckx et al., 2006; 
Gevers, Verguts et al., 2006), possible responses are activated in parallel, and relevant as 
well as irrelevant information in favor of one response versus another is propagated 
through multiple pathways.  This theory of the SNARC effect is derived from more 
general accounts of performing “conflict tasks” in which interference for response-
selection is induced by dimensional overlap between a task-irrelevant stimulus dimension 
and a task-relevant response dimension (Kornblum et al., 1990), in which executive 
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control of cognition is required to over-ride bottom-up influences on behavior in order to 
accomplish task goals, such as in Stroop (Macleod, 1991) or flankers tasks (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974).   
 In the computational model of the SNARC effect by Gevers, Verguts and 
colleagues (2006), the mental number line is represented by the joint activation of 
elements in a “number field” and a “standard field.”  The “number field” codes for 
specific the quantity information represented by the numerical stimulus and the “standard 
field” represents the mean of the range of presented numbers.  When a numerical 
stimulus is presented in a comparison task, magnitude information is automatically coded 
coarsely into binary categories (small/large) by a “magnitude layer” receiving 
information from the “number field” and “standard field”—thus according to the spatially 
directed mental number line.   
 This information is transmitted to a “response layer” consisting of two spatially 
defined choices (left/right), via a fast, “unconditional” route.  The left/right response 
nodes are connected through lateral inhibition.  One response is chosen for execution 
when an activation threshold is reached for one option versus the other.  The nodes in the 
response layer also receive task-specific activation via a slow, “conditional” route, which 
conveys information related to task instructions such as the stimulus-response mapping 
(e.g., “if ‘small’ respond ‘left’” versus “if ‘small’ respond ‘right’”).  Thus these two 
routes can be seen to correspond roughly to distinctions made elsewhere between 
stimulus-driven and goal-driven orienting processes in theories of attentional control 
(Corbetta & Schulman, 2002).   
 When magnitude information, coded according to a spatially directed mental 
number line, is “congruent” with task instructions, information in the unconditional and 
conditional routes converge to the same response option and thus responses are speeded.  
This would occur when, for example, magnitude is “small” and task instructions say to 
respond “left” when magnitude is “small.”  When magnitude information is in conflict 
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with task instructions, information in unconditional and conditional routes do not 
converge on the same response option and thus responses are slowed.  This would occur 
when, for example, magnitude is “small” and task instructions say to respond “right” 
when magnitude is “small.” 
 It might be possible to adapt this framework to performance of the number 
comparison task in the present experiment, to account for why the SNARC effect on RTs 
was attenuated when response-cuing provided complete information about the upcoming 
D2/response, and for why SNARC effects were evident in ERPs only after the 
appearance the imperative stimulus D2.  The model would be run in two cycles, first 
when the D1 response-cue appears, and again subsequently when the imperative stimulus 
D2 appears.  Additionally, there would need to be some mechanism for representing 
“expectancy” in a graded manner, based on a more exact magnitude representation of the 
D1 response-cue.  Based on activation of the number field and the standard field, the 
model could be adapted to represent magnitude in a way that differentiates “very small” 
from “small” and “very big” from “big” so that expectancy could be differentiated 
according to “certainty” versus “likelihood.”  Response activation associated with 
certainty would be allowed to grow more quickly than that associated with likelihood.  
Furthermore, there would need to be a mechanism for suppressing activation in the D1-
D2 interval to prevent premature responses.    
 First, consider the case where D1 = 1 and D2 = 9 and instructions are SNARC-
compatible (1, 9, C).  The first cycle is initiated upon presentation of D1.  The appearance 
of D1 would activate a magnitude representation of “small” which would activate the 
left-hand response automatically.  But the magnitude information in D1 would also be 
available to an “expectancy layer” which activates a representation of the conditional 
statement “if D1 is (very) small, expect D2 to be big (with certainty).”  This would be 
coupled to the “conditional route” representing task instructions, “if D2 big, press right.” 
This would activate the right-hand response, but more slowly.  So far the fast 
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unconditional route would be activating a left-hand response and the slow conditional 
route would be activating a right-hand response.   
 However, there is another task instruction that says “do not respond before seeing 
D2.”  Thus the fast activation of the left-hand response by magnitude of D1 would need 
to be suppressed in order to prevent premature responses.  There is evidence for 
inhibitory processes that are engaged to prevent premature responding (e.g., Duque, Lew, 
Mazzocchio, Olivier & Ivry, 2010).  In contrast, the activation of the right-hand response 
through the conditional route would not need to be suppressed because it would grow 
slowly and would not reach threshold before the appearance of D2, and thus would not 
come into conflict with the instruction forbidding early responses.   
 The second cycle is initiated upon presentation of D2.  Upon appearance of D2, 
activation in favor of a right-hand response would quickly reach threshold.  Magnitude 
representation of D2 would be “big,” activating a right-hand response via the 
unconditional route of Cycle 2.  Furthermore, activation in favor of a right-hand response 
from the conditional route that started in Cycle 1 would have been growing in the 
meantime.  Additionally, activation via the conditional route of Cycle 2 would be toward 
the right-hand response (“if D2 big, press right”).  Thus, all active routes at this point in 
time would be converging on a right-hand response.  
 Now consider the same D1-D2 pair but in the SNARC-incompatible condition (1, 
9, IC).  Cycle 1: D1 magnitude would send activation to the left-hand response via the 
fast unconditional route.  Expectancy/task instructions would activate a left-hand 
response as well (If D1 small, expect D2 big; if D2 big press left) via the slow conditional 
route.  The instruction not to respond before D2 would suppress the fast activation of the 
left-hand response, but not the slow activation of the left-hand response.  Cycle 2: D2 
appears, automatically priming a right-hand response via the fast unconditional route.  
But activation of the left-hand response has been allowed to grow in the meantime, and 
thus would have a “head start” on the unconditional right-hand activation.  Furthermore, 
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the slow conditional route from Cycle 2 would activate a left-hand response.  Thus, 
activation from two sources would be converging in favor of a left-hand response, and 
information from one source would be in favor of a right-hand response.  Of the two 
routes supporting a left-hand response, one would have been increasing in activation 
from Cycle 1, and would thus be in a position to win the race to response threshold.  
Therefore, there would be an attenuated SNARC effect on RTs when D1 supported 
complete certainty regarding the upcoming D2/response.   
 Next, consider the case where D1 = 3 and D2 = 9 and instructions are SNARC-
compatible (3, 9, C).  Cycle 1: The appearance of D1 would activate a magnitude 
representation of “small” which would activate the left-hand response automatically.  
This activation would be suppressed to prevent premature responses.  The slower 
conditional route information would activate the right-hand response, (If D2 is small, but 
not very small, expect D2 big, with likelihood.  And if D2 is big, respond right).  This 
activation would grow even more slowly in the case of mere likelihood compared to 
certainty, and thus would not be suppressed during Cycle 1.  Cycle 2: The appearance of 
D2 would automatically activate the right-hand response.  This would converge with 
activation in favor of right-hand response that was allowed to continue from Cycle 1.  
Additionally, conditional route information in Cycle 2 would support a right-hand 
response.  Thus, all three sources of activation would be converging on a right-hand 
response.     
 Next, consider the case where D1 = 3 and D2 = 9 and instructions are SNARC-
Incompatible (3, 9, IC). Cycle 1: The appearance of D1 would activate a magnitude 
representation of “small” which would activate the left-hand response automatically.  
This would be suppressed by the instruction against premature responses.  But here in the 
SNARC-incompatible case, the slower conditional route information would also activate 
the left-hand response (If D2 is small, but not very small, expect D2 big, with mere 
likelihood.  And if D2 is big, respond left).  It can be assumed that this activation would 
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grow even more slowly in the case of mere likelihood compared to certainty, and thus 
would not be suppressed during Cycle 1.  Cycle 2: The appearance of D2 would activate 
a right-hand response via the unconditional route.  Conditional route information from 
Cycle 1 would have been growing to support a left-hand response.  Conditional 
information from Cycle 2 would support a left-hand response.  Thus, two out of three 
sources of activation would converge to support a left-hand response, and these would be 
the slower routes.  The faster activation of the right-hand response from the unconditional 
route in Cycle 2 would compete with the slower activation from the conditional routes 
activated in Cycles 1 and 2.  Thus there would be a SNARC effect on RTs when the D1 
response cue provided only likelihood information and not certainty.   
 Next, consider the case where responses are invalidly cued by D1, for example 
when D1 = 3 and D2 = 1, and instructions are SNARC-compatible (3, 1, C).  Cycle 1: 
activation in favor of a left-hand response has been suppressed in the unconditional route 
to prevent premature responses but activation in favor of a right-hand response is allowed 
to grow in the conditional route.  Cycle 2: unconditional route fast activation supports 
left-hand response, conditional route slower activation also supports left-hand response.  
Only two out of three sources of activation support the correct left-hand response, but one 
is relatively fast.   
 Finally consider the case where D1 = 3 and D2 = 1 and instructions are SNARC-
Incompatible (3, 1, IC).  Cycle 1: fast unconditional route activation left-hand response 
suppressed, slow conditional route activation left-hand response allowed to grow.  Cycle 
2: fast unconditional route left-hand activation but slow conditional route activation for 
right-hand response.  Thus, two out of three support the incorrect left-hand response.  
Furthermore one is relatively fast and the other has been allowed to grow since Cycle 1.  
Thus there is stronger activation of the incorrect response in the case where response-
cuing provides only likelihood information and stimulus-response mapping is SNARC-
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incompatible compared to when it is SNARC-compatible.  Therefore, correct responses 
will be slower in the SNARC-incompatible versus SNARC-compatible condition. 
 To summarize, the preceding discussion was a qualitative stepping-through of the 
dual-route model of the SNARC effect, adapted here by additional mechanisms for 
computing expectancy and for suppressing premature responses.  This exercise of 
stepping through the conditions in the experiment with the modified dual-route model led 
to conclusions that were consistent with the RT results, namely, a SNARC effect when 
prior response-probability was equal to .66 but not when it was equal to 1; and a SNARC 
effect for invalidly cued trials.   
 The dual-route model is a cognitive theory and does not make 
biological/psychophysiological assumptions or predictions.  However, the qualitative 
two-cycle dual-route framework presented above is broadly consistent with the ERP 
results of the present experiment, to the extent that that SNARC interference was evident 
in the LRP (and P300) components after the appearance of the imperative stimulus D2 
but not before, i.e., during “Cycle 2” but not “Cycle 1” of the adapted model.  In the 
above framework, this would be a consequence of the mechanism for suppressing fast 
unconditional-route activation of a spatial dimension associated with the D1 response-
cue, in order to prevent premature responses.       
Future Directions 
 It may be profitable in future research to more rigorously explore the implications 
of the two-cycle dual-route framework articulated in the preceding remarks.  In general, 
quantitative theories are relatively rare in electrophysiological research.  As a direction 
for future research more generally, it may be profitable for electrophysiology as a field to 
promote the development and refinement of quantitative theories integrating cognitive 
and psychophysiological concepts (Jennings & van der Molen, 2006).  
 One of the key findings of the experiment was that SNARC effects were observed 
in the LRP after the appearance of the second number for comparison but not before, 
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even when the first number had given complete advance information to enable earlier 
response-selection.  This was explained by appealing to a mechanism for suppressing 
activation that could lead to premature responses.  This hypothesis should be a focus of 
future experiments.   
 The experiment produced a novel finding of a SNARC effect on the P300 ERP 
component, in which amplitudes were more positive in SNARC-compatible conditions.  
This result is suggestive of parietal contributions to the SNARC effect, and should be a 
focus of future experiments.  For example, it may be due to an artifact of the design, in 
which SNARC-compatibility was varied across blocks of trials rather than trial by trial.  
Future experiments would need to address this issue by manipulating SNARC-
compatibility trial by trial, while preserving the response-cuing device.  It would be 
further beneficial to disentangle potential SNARC interference associated with the 
response cue from prior response-probability, by communicating prior response-
probability with a response cue that does not itself carry numerical magnitude 
information., or alternatively, manipulating prior response-probability by means of 
varying stimulus frequencies across blocks of trials.   
 Additional directions for future research include investigating whether present 
SNARC effects are specific to numerical stimuli or if they would be obtained with other 
kinds of ordinal information such as letters, days of the week, or months, etc.  Further, it 
would be valuable to explore different stimulus-response mappings, for example, with 
vertically arranged response buttons, to determine if the relevant spatial coordinates refer 






SPATIAL-NUMERIC ASSOCIATION OF ATTENTIONAL CUING 
 ERP studies of SNARC in the parity task have observed ERP effects associated 
with response-selection processes as a function of SNARC-compatibility; but effects of a 
mental number line concept are possible at earlier stages of processing as well.  The goal 
of Experiment 2 was to extend the previous investigation of SNARC with respect to 
“response-space” to the domain of visuospatial attention.  A small amount of previous 
work has addressed the possibility that numerical magnitude can influence earlier stages 
of processing such as orienting visuospatial attention, as a spatial-numeric association of 
attentional cuing (SNAAC).           
SNAAC 
 Results suggest that digits can activate an implicit generalized code for magnitude 
that can bias attention during the cue-target interval, in a similar way to explicitly spatial 
pre-cues such as arrows or peripheral flashes (e.g., Posner, 1980).  Fischer, Castel, Dodd, 
and Pratt (2003) examined the effect of digit-magnitude on orienting visuospatial 
attention, presenting a single digit at fixation to serve as a “warning signal” in a target 
detection task.  Simple RTs to detect a peripheral target in the left visual field were faster 
after viewing small-magnitude digit pre-cues (“validly-cued”) than after viewing large-
magnitude digit pre-cues (“invalidly-cued”) presented at fixation.  Corresponding effects 
were observed for RTs to detect targets in the right visual field.  These effects were 
interpreted as attentional orienting in a manner consistent with the ordered mental 
number line.  This phenomenon can be alternatively called “attentional-SNARC” (Dodd, 
Van der Stigchel, Leghari, Fung & Kingstone, 2008). 
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    An open question is whether digit stimuli elicit exogenous (automatic) shifts of 
attention, like a bright bar suddenly flashed in a possible target location prior to the 
appearance of the target; or else whether they facilitate endogenous (voluntary) shifts like 
an arrow, or other symbol, associated with one side of space or the other.  Exogenous, or 
automatic, attentional orienting occurs in response to an attention-capturing stimulus like 
a briefly flashed bar in one visual hemifield before a target appears near that location.  
Endogenous, or voluntary, attentional orienting is mediated by interpreting a symbolic 
cue like an arrow symbol or other figure that can be assigned to direction in left-right 
space (Wright & Ward, 2008; but for an alternative taxonomy see Gibson & Kingstone, 
2006).    
 The assumption that digit magnitudes are processed automatically and 
obligatorily is widely held, but has been sometimes challenged (e.g., Pansky & Algom, 
2002).  Notably in this connection, Galfano, Rusconi, and Umiltà (2006) replicated, and 
then reversed, the original findings of Fischer et al. (2003), by manipulating explicit 
instructions to participants concerning how to interpret digit stimuli according to a 
directed mental number line.  In one condition, cuing instructions were consistent with 
the proposed dominant tendency to associate small numbers with left visual space and 
large numbers with right visual space.  In the other condition, space-number mappings 
were reversed by the instructions.   
 RTs showed similar benefits to “validly-cued” targets across instructional 
settings, suggesting that attentional effects due to digit magnitude are not automatic or 
obligatory, but are to some extent susceptible to voluntary and intentional control.  In 
contrast, the attention-directing properties of more biologically significant orienting cues 
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such as eye-gaze cartoons were less modifiable by task instructions (Galfano et al., 2006).  
Thus, it appears that digit magnitude can be used to direct attention to spatial locations in 
accordance with a directed mental number line, but that the mapping of digit-magnitude 
to space is not fixed in a left-right orientation and can be altered flexibly according to 
participant intentions.   
 The attentional orienting properties of digit pre-cues are ambiguous in light of the 
evidence.  Because digit pre-cue magnitude was unrelated to subsequent target-location, 
and because participants were instructed as much, results of Fischer and colleagues 
(2003) suggested that exogenous orienting mechanisms were at work.  However, results 
of Galfano and colleagues (2006) showed that the orienting properties of digit pre-cues 
were easily modifiable by task instructions and participant goals.  Together, these 
considerations suggest that digit cues are uneasily accommodated by the general 
exogenous/endogenous framework for interpreting the attention-directing properties of 
pre-cues (see also Gibson & Kingstone, 2006).  The following section introduces some 
recent ERP experiments that might further clarify the attention-directing properties of 
digit pre-cues. 
Experiments with Simple Target Detection and ERP 
 Salillas, El Yagoubi, and Semenza (2008) performed a straightforward ERP 
replication of the behavioral experiment by Fischer et al (2003).  Note that here as in the 
study by Fischer and colleagues (2003), “cue validity” was defined on the basis of the 
hypothesized SNARC relationship.  Participants were instructed to ignore digit stimuli.  
The authors reported SNARC-like attentional effects from central digit stimuli in ERP 
responses to targets as early as 80 ms after stimulus onset.  Peak amplitudes for the P1 
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component for left visual field targets following small-magnitude digit stimuli (valid left-
cue) were greater than following large-magnitude digit stimuli (invalid left-cue).  
Conversely, P1 amplitudes for right visual field targets were greater following large-
magnitude digit stimuli (valid right-cue) than following small-magnitude digit stimuli 
(invalid right-cue).  Finding increased P1 amplitude in response to target stimuli as a 
function of valid pre-cuing is usually interpreted to indicate enhanced stimulus 
processing due to attention (Luck, Woodman & Vogel, 2000).  Thus, results suggest that 
centrally viewed digits can direct attention to peripheral spatial locations, with 
consequences for subsequent stimulus processing, similar to more traditional orienting 
cues like arrows or flashes (Posner, 1980; Wright & Ward, 2008).   
 Ranzini, Dehaene, Piazza, and Hubbard (2009) extended the work of Salillas and 
colleagues (2008) by examining ERPs to the digit pre-cues instead of the subsequent 
targets.  Ranzini and colleagues (2009) examined ERP responses to digit pre-cues 
compared to arrows, again in a target detection task requiring speeded simple RTs.  As in 
the study by Salillas and colleagues (2008), orienting cues were not systematically related 
to the location of subsequent targets, as is usual in studies of “exogenous” orienting cues.  
Indeed, participants were explicitly instructed that arrow-direction and digit-magnitude 
were both unrelated to subsequent target location.   
 Nevertheless, Ranzini and colleagues (2009) found that arrow and digit stimuli 
alike led to faster RTs when arrows or digit pre-cues validly directed attention to the 
location at which subsequent targets in fact appeared.  Furthermore, arrow and digit pre-
cues alike elicited ERPs that were lateralized systematically with the presumed direction 
of attention, corresponding to two lateralized ERP components referred to as the Anterior 
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Directing Attention Negativity and Early Directing Attention Negativity (EDAN) 
components; which can be observed during the cue-target interval in attentional cuing 
studies (Jongen, Smulders & Van der Heiden, 2007).  However, attentional ERP effects 
were much smaller for digit pre-cues compared to arrows.   
 Overall, these findings further demonstrated that digit stimuli can elicit lateralized 
shifts of attention consistent with an underlying spatial representation of numerical 
magnitude.  Additionally, because arrow and digit stimuli were non-predictive of 
subsequent target locations, and because participants were explicitly instructed as much, 
these findings suggest that digit stimuli may operate via exogenous cuing mechanisms 
during the cue-target interval (and similar to arrows; see also Gibson & Kingstone, 2006).   
Theoretical Accounts of SNAAC 
 Behavioral and ERP investigators of the orienting properties of digits have 
interpreted their findings as evidence for automatic responses to digit magnitude, in a 
manner corresponding to a spatial organization of numerical concepts (a directed mental 
number line), according to which relatively small-magnitude numbers are associated with 
left visual space and relatively large-magnitude numbers are associated with right visual 
space.  Regardless of the precise nature of the underlying mechanisms, these previous 
studies have shown that digit pre-cue magnitude can be used to elicit shifts of 
visuospatial attention in advance of an expected imperative stimulus, indicated by RTs 
and ERPs. 
Present Research (Experiment 2) 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to extend the investigation of spatial-numeric 
associations in relation to response-selection that was pursued in Experiment 1, to 
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investigate spatial-numeric associations in relation to attentional cuing, by presenting 
task-irrelevant visual probes during D1-D2 interval, either to the left or right of fixation.  
ERP responses to these task-irrelevant visual probes were expected to be modulated by 
D1 magnitude corresponding to a directed mental number line, as in the target detection 
experiments with digit pre-cues, reviewed in the introduction (Ranzini et al., 2009; 
Salillas et al., 2008).  It was predicted that ERPs to left-side visual probes would be 
enhanced following small- versus large-magnitude digit pre-cues, and that ERPs to right-
side visual probes would be enhanced following large- versus small-magnitude digit pre-
cues.  More specifically, these effects were expected for early visual ERPs such as the P1 
or N1 components, usually occurring 100 ms – 200 ms post-stimulus, and have been 








METHOD EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 This chapter reports information about participants, materials and procedure, for 
behavioral tasks and electrophysiological recording in Experiment 2.  
Participants 
 28 volunteers (14 females) between the ages of 18 and 40 years (M = 19.71, SD = 
1.90) participated in the experiment and were compensated with pay or partial course 
credit.  All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  27 participants were 
right-handed by self-report.  The experiment was done with the approval of the 
Institutional Review Board of Georgia Institute of Technology.  Participants gave written 
informed consent.   
Procedure 
 Trial sequences and stimuli are depicted in Figure 24.  The experimental tasks 
were exactly as in Experiment 1 except for the following differences.  A task-irrelevant 
visual probe was presented during the D1-D2 interval, either to the left or right of 
fixation, with equal likelihood on each trial, with the constraint that probes appeared to 
the left or right an equal number of times in each block for each D1 cue.  Probes appeared 
during the D1-D2 interval either relatively early (200 ms) or late (450 ms) after D1 onset 
(an equal number of times per block).  The specific stimulus-onset asynchronies (200 ms 
versus 450 ms) were chosen based on extensive past research showing these to be the 
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time ranges in which, respectively, exogenous and endogenous attentional cuing benefits 
can be maximally distinguished (Wright & Ward, 2008).  Additionally, 450 ms was 
chosen to match the stimulus-onset asynchrony in the target detection experiment by 
Salillas and colleagues (2008).  The probe stimulus was a ‘+’ symbol displayed 
approximately 1 cm in height by 1 cm in width, subtending approximately 1º of visual 
angle, in white font against the black background, approximately 4º of visual angle to the 
left or right of fixation.  Participants were instructed to ignore the task-irrelevant visual 
probes.  Probes did not appear on 1/3 of trials (no-probe trials).  D1 cues ‘1’ and ‘3’ were 
classified as “small” and D1 cues  ‘7’ and ‘9’ were classified as “big.”  There were a total 
of 48 trials in the experiment for each cell of the design, crossing the factors D1 
magnitude (small, big), hemifield in which the probe appeared (left, right), and time at 






Figure 24.  Trial Sequence Experiment 2.  Event-sequence and stimuli in Experiment 2 
trials.  Participants reported whether the second digit (D2) was less than or greater than 
the first digit (D1) by responding with left- or right-handed key-press.  Participants were 
instructed to ignore task-irrelevant peripheral probes, here depicted as appearing to the 
left of fixation.       
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EEG Recording and Analysis 
 Electrophysiological data were recorded using a BioSemi Active-Two amplifier 
system (Amsterdam, Netherlands) and was digitized at 512 Hz.  Scalp potentials were 
recorded from 32 electrode sites: FP1/2, F7/8, F3/4, Fz, C3/4, Cz, P7/8, P3/4, Pz, T7/8, 
O1/2, Oz, AF3/4, FC1/2, CP1/2, PO3/4, FC5/6, and CP5/6.  Two additional electrodes 
will serve as reference and ground electrodes. These electrodes were the common mode 
sense (CMS) and driven right leg (DRL), respectively.  Vertical electrooculogram (EOG) 
was calculated offline as the difference between electrodes positioned above and below 
the left eye.  Horizontal EOG was calculated offline as the difference between electrodes 
positioned on the outer canthi of the left and right eyes.   
 EEG data were analyzed using BrainVision Analyzer (Brain Products, Gilching, 
Germany).  Offline, all channels were re-referenced to the algebraic average of the left 
and right mastoids.  Continuous EEG was digitally band-pass filtered from 0.1 to 30 Hz 
using a zero phase-shift Butterworth filter (12 dB/oct).   These procedures were as in 
Experiment 1 except for the following differences.  EEG were segmented into 700 ms 
segments beginning 200 ms pre-stimulus and continuing 500 ms post-stimulus (the 
peripheral probe).  Segments were then baseline corrected by setting the average of the 
200 ms pre-stimulus baseline to zero.   
 The ocular correction method was not used in Experiment 2 for removing ocular 
artifacts.  Instead, a two-step procedure was used in Experiment 2 to exclude artifacts due 
to eye-movements: 1) first, activity greater than ± 50 µV in the HEOG channel was 
rejected as artifacts, and 2) next, participants’ averages were formed for right and left 
visual field probes separately and participants were excluded if average HEOG activity 
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exceeded ± 5 µV.   This ensured that no systematic eye-movements over 0.2º were 
included in the data.  Additionally, segments containing activity greater than ±80 µV in 
the scalp and VEOG channels were considered artifacts and rejected in order to control 







RESULTS AND DISCUSSION EXPERIMENT 2 
  
 In this chapter behavioral results of Experiment 2 are reported first, examining 
combined effects of SNARC-compatibility and prior response-probability; and 
separately, examining combined effects of SNARC-compatibility and cue-validity.  Then 
electrophysiological results are reported, examining effects of D1 magnitude, visual field 
in which the task-irrelevant probe appeared, and the time at which it appeared.    
Behavioral Results 
 Behavioral results in Experiment 2 were examined to check for replication of 
effects in Experiment 1.  However, the main focus of the investigation in Experiment 2 
was on the ERPs to the task-irrelevant peripheral probes.   
 As noted, the nesting of “D1 response-cue-validity” within the manipulation of 
prior response-probability entailed that separate analyses were required to examine 
effects of SNARC-compatibility in combination with those of 1) prior response-
probability and 2) D1 response-cue-validity.  These are reported next in turn, with 
separate ANOVAs for response time (RT) and response accuracy.     
SNARC-Compatibility and Prior Response-Probability 
 A 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to examine effects of the 
independent variables SNARC-Compatibility (Compatible, Incompatible) and Prior 
Response-Probability (.66, 1) on Mean RT as the dependent variable.  Only correct trials 
were included.  Only trials in which D1 was a valid cue were included.  Results across 
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conditions are depicted in Figure 25 (left panel).  The effects of SNARC-compatibility 
and Prior Response-Probability were each significant, F (1, 27) = 12.84, p =.001, ηp
2 
= 
.322, and F (1, 27) = 96.05, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .781, respectively.  RTs were faster in 
SNARC-Compatible versus SNARC-Incompatible conditions (M = 403.96, SE = 25.69, 
and M = 479.15, SE = 30.51, respectively).  RTs were faster when Prior Response-
Probability was equal to 1 versus when it was equal to .66 (M = 370.27, SE = 29.37, and 
M = 512.85, SE = 24.78, respectively).  However, these effects were qualified by their 
significant interaction, F (1, 27) = 6.52, p = .017, ηp
2 
= .194.  Post hoc analysis confirmed 
that the effect of SNARC-Compatibility was larger when Prior Response-Probability was 
equal to .66 compared to when it was equal to 1 (M = 95.76, SE = 23.21, and M = 54.62, 
SE = 21.72, respectively), t (27) = 2.55, p = .017 (Md = 41.14, SEd = 16.12).    
 A 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to examine effects of the 
independent variables SNARC-Compatibility (Compatible, Incompatible) and Prior 
Response-Probability (.66, 1) on Mean Proportion-Correct Responses as the dependent 
variable.  Only trials in which D1 was a valid cue were included.  Results across 
conditions are depicted in Figure 25 (right panel).  The effects of SNARC-Compatibility 
and Prior Response-Probability were not significant, F (1, 27) = 1.21, p = .280, ηp
2 
= 
.043, and F (1, 27) = 1.07, p = .310, ηp
2 
= .038, respectively.  The interaction was not 









Figure 25.  Behavioral Results SNARC and Prior-Response Probability.  Response time 
(left) and response accuracy (right) in Experiment 2, with the factors of SNARC-
compatibility and prior response-probability.  Legend: C means SNARC-compatible, IC 
means SNARC-incompatible.    
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SNARC-Compatibility and Response Cue-Validity 
 Separately, a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to examine effects 
of the independent variables SNARC-Compatibility (Compatible, Incompatible) and 
Cue-Validity (Valid, Invalid) on Mean RT as the dependent variable.  Only correct trials 
were included.  Only trials in which Prior Response-Probability was equal to .66 were 
included.  Results across conditions are depicted in Figure 26 (left panel).  The effects of 
SNARC-Compatibility and Cue-Validity were each significant, F (1, 27) = 20.75, p 
<.001, ηp
2 
= .435, and F (1, 27) = 11.47, p = .002, ηp
2 
= .298, respectively.  RTs were 
faster in SNARC-Compatible versus SNARC-Incompatible conditions (M = 472.71, SE = 
25.10, and M = 573.66, SE = 29.99, respectively).  RTs were faster when the response 
was validly cued by D1 (M = 512.85, SE = 24.78, and M = 533.52, SE = 26.50, 
respectively).  The interaction was not significant, F (1, 27) = 1.34, p = .257, ηp
2 
= .047. 
 Separately, a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to examine effects 
of the independent variables SNARC-Compatibility (Compatible, Incompatible) and 
Cue-Validity (Valid, Invalid) on Mean Proportion-Correct Responses as the dependent 
variable.  Only trials in which Prior Response-Probability was equal to .66 were included.  
Results across conditions are depicted in Figure 26 (right panel).  The effects of SNARC-
Compatibility and Cue-Validity were not significant, F < 1, and F (1, 27) = 2.30, p = 
.141, ηp
2 
= .078, respectively.  The interaction was not significant, F (1, 27) = 1.15, p = 
.231, ηp
2 






Figure 26.  Behavioral Results SNARC and Response-Cue-Validity.  Response time 
(left) and response accuracy (right) in Experiment 2, with the factors of SNARC-
compatibility and prior response-probability.  Legend: C means SNARC-compatible, IC 
means SNARC-incompatible.  
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Discussion Behavioral Results Experiment 2 
 RTs in the number comparison task largely replicated results of Experiment 1.  
This suggests that the additional experimental procedure of presenting task-irrelevant 
peripheral probes did not substantially change performance of the number comparison 
task (consistent with design intentions).  As in Experiment 1, response accuracy did not 
provide evidence of speed-accuracy tradeoffs.     
ERP Results 
 As noted, the main focus of the investigation in Experiment 2 was on the ERPs to 
the task-irrelevant peripheral probes.  Therefore the experimental factors of SNARC-
compatibility and prior response-probability do not contribute to the following analyses.  
ERPs at the contralateral posterior electrode (P8 and P7 electrodes, respectively) were 
submitted to analyses and are depicted time-locked to probes appearing in left and right 
visual hemifields, for either “early” (Figure 27) or “late” (Figure 28) probes.  For 
improved visualization, high-frequency noise was additionally removed from the data 
before graphing, using a low-pass filter set at 10 Hz.   
 ERPs to Early probes (200 ms post-D1 onset) appeared to be distorted by ERPs to 
the preceding D1 cue, evident as drifting baseline activity.  However, ERPs to Late 
probes (450 ms post-D1 onset) appeared more typical, showing clear negative peaks in 
the 100 – 200 ms post-probe interval, possibly corresponding to the visual N1 
component, which is sensitive to attention (Luck et al., 2000). The following analyses of 
ERP mean area amplitude were focused on this time window.      
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ERP to Probe 
 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs were performed separately for probes 
appearing 200 ms and 450 ms after D1, with the factors Visual Hemifield (Left, Right) 
and D1 Magnitude (Small, Large) on mean area amplitude (µV) in the 100 – 200 ms post-
probe interval, at the contralateral electrode.  D1 pre-cues ‘1’ and ‘3’ were classified as 
“small” and D1 pre-cues ‘7’ and ‘9’ were classified as “large” for the following analyses.        
ERPs to left-side and right-side probes were analyzed at the respective contralateral 
posterior electrode, P8 and P7.  Data from one participant were excluded due to excessive 
eye blinks.     
Early Probe (200 ms Post-D2) 
 See Figure 27 for ERP waveforms.  Mean area amplitude (µV) in the 100 – 200 
ms post-probe interval was examined in ANOVA.  The main effect of Visual Hemifield 
was not significant, F < 1.  The main effect of D1 Magnitude was not significant, F (1, 
26) = 2.64, p = .116, ηp
2 
= .092.  The interaction was also not significant, F < 1.   
 These data were re-examined after applying a .5 Hz high-pass filter, in order to 
remove potential distortion from low-frequency drift in the baseline period, but results 
were not substantially altered.  ERPs in this analysis are further limited by the small 









Figure 27.  ERP to Early Probes.  ERPs to early probes (200 ms post-D1 onset).  Probe 
onset = 0 ms, unit = 100 ms.  P8 and P7 indicate electrode. 
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Late Probe (450 ms Post-D2) 
 See Figure 28 for ERP waveforms.  ERPs to Late probes (450 ms post-D1 onset) 
showed more typical-looking waveforms; with evident peaks around 100 – 200 ms post-
probe.  Mean area amplitude (µV) in the 100 – 200 ms post-probe interval was examined 
in ANOVA.  The main effect of Visual Hemifield was not significant, F (1, 26) = 1.62, p 
= .214, ηp
2 
= .059.  The main effect of D1 Magnitude was not significant, F (1, 26) = 
3.61, p = .068, ηp
2 
= .122.  The interaction was also not significant, F < 1.   
 However, these waveforms too seem to be distorted by some artifact, noting that 
they show a general drift as well as apparent separation of the waveforms at time-point 
zero (although this is not a statistically significant separation).  ERPs in this analysis are 
further limited by the small number of trials contributing to the waveforms (maximum 48 
per individual).  These data were re-examined as well after applying a .5 Hz high-pass 
filter, in order to remove potential distortion from low-frequency drift, but the apparent 
separation at time-point zero was not substantially altered.  It cannot be stated with 
confidence that the trend for an effect of D1 magnitude is specific to the N1 component.     
 Scalp maps for three time intervals are presented in Figure 29, Figure 30, and 
Figure 31.  These suggest that the peak negativities in the time window 100 – 200 ms 
post-probe were specific to posterior electrodes contralateral to the visual hemifield in 
which the probe appeared.  This would be consistent with the scalp distribution for the 
N1.  In contrast, the scalp distributions corresponding to the earlier time window (0 – 100 
ms post-probe) in which the waveforms appeared to separate do not show such regional 
specificity; neither do those for the subsequent time window (200 – 300 ms post-probe).   
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Therefore, the negative peaks occurring in the waveforms for late probe ERPs appear to 
be specific to visual processing of the peripheral probes.      
 But overall, the ERPs to the late probes may not be sufficiently credible to 
evaluate the research hypothesis, much like the ERPs to the early probes.  The simplest 
explanation for this state of affairs is related to the fact that a maximum of only 48 trials 
per individual could have contributed to the ERPs for each cell of the design, which 
includes early and late probes as a within-subjects factor.  This is likely an insufficient 
number of trials for an adequate signal-to-noise ratio for examining relatively small ERP 
components such as P1 or N1 (Luck, 2005b).  This design limitation would need to be 
remedied in future investigations of the attention-directing properties of numerical 








Figure 28.  ERP to Late Probes.  ERPs to late probes (450 ms post-D1 onset).  Probe 







Figure 29.  Scalp Distributions to Late Probes 0 – 100 ms Post-Stimulus.  ERP scalp 
distributions (in the time window 0 ms – 100 ms post-probe onset) for late probes 







Figure 30.  Scalp Distributions to Late Probes 100 – 200 ms Post-Stimulus.  ERP scalp 
distributions (in the time window 100 ms – 200 ms post-probe onset) for late probes 
appearing in left or right visual field and following small or large D1 cues.  Scalp maps 








Figure 31.  Scalp Distributions to Late Probes 200 – 300 ms Post-Stimulus.  ERP scalp 
distributions (in the time window 200 ms – 300 ms post-probe onset) for late probes 
appearing in left or right visual field and following small or large D1 cues.  
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Summary and Discussion ERP Results Experiment 2 
 Based on the notion that attentional shifts can be elicited by digit pre-cues in 
accordance with a mental number line associating small-magnitude numbers with left-
space and large- magnitude numbers with right-space, and with a few previous 
experiments with simple detection paradigms showing evidence consistent with this 
notion, it was expected in the present experiment that ERPs to task-irrelevant visual 
probes would be modulated in an interaction of visual hemifield with D1 pre-cue 
magnitude.  Specifically it was expected that ERPs would be enhanced to left-side probes 
following small D1 pre-cues and to right-side probes following large D1 pre-cues.  
Additionally it was expected that these effects might differ across probes appearing 
relatively early or late in the D1- D2 interval (100 ms and 450 ms after D1 onset, 
respectively), on the assumption that responses to early and late probes would reflect 
differing degrees of exogenous versus endogenous attentional cuing, respectively.   
 The ERPs to the early probes were distorted due to overlapping ERPs evoked by 
the preceding D1 and were not useful for evaluating the research hypothesis.  In contrast, 
the ERPs to the late probes appeared more typical, with an evident negative peak 
occurring in the interval 100 – 200 ms following the probes.  This peak possibly 
corresponded to the visual N1 component, which has been shown to be sensitive to 
variation in attention (Luck et al., 2000).  There was a possible trend in this time window 
for more negative ERPs following small- versus large-magnitude digit pre-cues.   
 The ERPs to the late probes did not provide clear support for the research 
hypothesis that ERPs would be enhanced in a SNARC-like manner, i.e., enhanced for 
left-probes after small digit pre-cues and for right-probes after large digit pre-cues.  
However, the waveforms to the late probes also showed evidence of artifactual distortion, 
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showing a general pattern of negative-going drift and apparent separation at time-point 
zero, undermining possible conclusions.   
 The simplest explanation for the doubtful quality of the ERP waveforms in this 
experiment is that the numbers of trials contributing to them (maximum 48 per 
individual) were grossly insufficient to achieve an adequate signal-to-noise ratio for 
examining relatively small ERP components such as visual P1 or N1, which typically 
require upwards of 200 trials to be reliable (Luck, 2005b).  Thus for the purposes of this 
discussion, any conclusions from the ERPs must be tenuous and provisional.   
 However, the scalp maps depicting the distribution of cortical response across the 
head at three time points after the visual probes might provide some limited support for 
the validity ERPs to the late probes.  Specifically, scalp maps in the time interval 
corresponding to the apparent peaks in the waveforms showed maximal negativities at 
posterior recording sites contralateral to the probe locations, consistent with the typical 
distribution for the N1.  In contrast, scalp maps during the earlier time window in which 
apparent separation of waveforms was noted did not show such regional specificity.   
 The classical “size effect” in number comparison tasks takes the form of faster 
RTs to decide which of two numbers is larger, if both numbers are relatively small (e.g., 
‘1’ versus ‘3’) compared to when both numbers are relatively large (e.g., ‘7’ versus ‘9’) 
even if the numerical “distance” between the two numbers is the same in both 
comparisons (Cohen-Kadosh, 2008).  If the tentative result disclosed in the present 
exploration, the trend for enhanced ERPs to late probes after small D1 pre-cues, is taken 
at face value, this result might suggest a mechanism of greater cortical activation in 
response to viewing relatively small numbers compared to large ones that would partly 
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explain the classical “size effect.”  It might be fruitful to further investigate this intriguing 
and novel possibility in future experiments designed to explain the numerical “size 
effect.”   
 All the same, there was only a trend for enhanced negativity following small 
versus large digit pre-cues.  Furthermore, even if this trend were to be taken at face value, 
it is unclear whether it is specifically related to numerical magnitude or to other stimulus 
characteristics.  Specifically, although the visual stimuli eliciting the ERPs were 
physically identical except for their spatial location, the number stimuli just preceding 
them in time were not physically identical.  It cannot be assumed that the different 
stimulus characteristics of the digit pre-cues did not have relatively long-lasting 
differential effects on the ERPs evoked by subsequent probes (Luck, 2005b).  Therefore 
the visual ERPs to the peripheral probes after small and large digit pre-cues might be 
distorted by differential responses to the physical shapes of ‘1’ and ‘3’ versus ‘7’ and ‘9’ 
respectively.  This deficiency could be easily remedied in future experiments by varying 
the ranges of numbers defining “small” and “large.”          
 Taking the results at face value, contrary to the research hypothesis there was no 
evidence for an interaction of visual hemifield and D1 magnitude for ERPs evoked by the 
task-irrelevant visual probes.  Thus the present experiment shows a failure to generalize 
ERP findings of attentional shifts associated with digit pre-cues from simple target 
detection tasks in previous work (Sallilas et al., 2008; Ranzini et al., 2009) to the number 
comparison task in the present work.  Thus, the present findings seem to partly 
undermine the idea that processing numerical information automatically biases attention 
according to a mental number line that associates small numbers with left space and large 
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numbers with right space.  If such automatic shifts of attention occurred in the present 
experiment, they went undetected by the ERPs that were obtained by probing visual 
responses after participants had to encode and interpret a numerical stimulus.                
  A possible explanation for the absence in the present experiment of SNARC-like 
effects on visuospatial attention from digit pre-cues can be articulated based on the 
modified dual-route model of SNARC effects that was applied in the discussion of 
Experiment 1.  Recall that to account for performance of the number comparison task, it 
was assumed that fast automatic activation of a spatial representation in response to D1 
magnitude was suppressed in order to prevent premature responses.  This mechanism 
would operate likewise in the task in Experiment 2, and would likely tend to nullify 
visuospatial biases related to a mental number line concept during the D1-D2 interval.   
 Alternatively, Wood and Fischer (2008) drew attention to the empirical fact that 
that SNARC-related effects tend to be observed for response-selection, and not for earlier 
processes related to visuospatial attention, when numerical information determines the 
response to be executed, as in the standard parity task or the number comparison tasks in 
the present experiments.  In contrast, attention-SNARC effects have been so far observed 
when numerical information is task-irrelevant and encoded only incidentally, as in the 
target detection task with digit pre-cues (Wood & Fischer, 2008).   
 On a more general level, this empirical pattern is consistent with the view that 
spatial reference frames for perception and for action are coded by different neural 
populations (Milner & Goodale, 2006).  The present experiment was intended in part to 
yield positive evidence that would falsify this inductive generalization.  SNARC 
interference was observed for RTs in the number comparison task, indicating that spatial-
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numeric associations were operating again in the realm of response-selection.  However, 
no SNARC-like attentional effects were observed.  These results are consistent with the 
above hypothesis of Wood and Fischer (2008), although they cannot be counted as 
positive evidence.     
 However, the conjecture by Wood and Fischer (2008) can be undermined by 
noting some additional evidence against it in the literature (Dodd, van der Stigchel, 
Leghari, Fung & Kingstone, 2008).  Dodd and colleagues (2008) compared the attention-
directing properties of digit pre-cues in simple target detection against other terms 
denoting ordinal relationships (e.g., letters, days of the week).  Non-numerical terms 
appeared to cue attention shifts according to a directed spatial representation, analogous 
to the mental number line, only when participants were required to process the ordinal 
information of the pre-cues; whereas digit pre-cues did so regardless of whether their 
ordinal content was implicitly or explicitly processed.     
 Another possibility for the present failure to find attention-related effects in the 
ERPs evoked by peripheral visual probes lies in the fact that in contrast to the previous 
target detection experiments cited (Ranzini et al., 2009; Salillas et al., 2008), processing 
the peripheral stimuli in the present experiment (as well as the locations at which they 
appeared) was task-irrelevant (and participants were instructed to ignore them), 
regardless of whether processing the numerical information was task-relevant or task-
irrelevant.  Furthermore, participants were concurrently engaged at fixation with 
performing the attention-demanding number comparison task, which may have left few 
attentional resources for processing events occurring in the periphery (Lavie, 2010).  
Another possibility is that the peripheral visual probes in the present experiment provided 
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visual stimulation that was simply too weak to provide a sensitive index of visuospatial 
attention.     
 The present investigation can be situated in the larger context of investigations of 
the properties of objects/events that cause individuals to orient attention to a particular 
region of space.  Traditionally, attentional cues been classified as “exogenous” and 
“automatic” or “endogenous” and “voluntary,” corresponding to classical distinctions in 
cognitive psychology (Wright & Ward, 2008).  Attention is said to be “captured” by 
exogenous cues such as a bright flash appearing in the periphery.  Attention is said to be 
voluntarily directed to a peripheral location after interpreting a symbol, such as an arrow, 
appearing in central vision.  However, recent research and theory have complicated this 
framework.     
 Gibson and colleagues have questioned the general continued theoretical utility of 
the influential exogenous/ endogenous distinction, advocating instead a contrast between 
“projective” cues, such as verbal instructions (words), that require semantic interpretation 
in relation to a selected spatial reference frame, and “deictic” cues, including arrows, 
sudden-onset flashes, and eye-gaze cartoons, which operate on attention more directly 
without the need for “imposing a reference frame on the cue” (Gibson & Kingstone, 
2006; p 626).  Within this framework, whether a spatial reference frame is evoked by 
numbers projectively or deictically depends on whether the mental number line concept is 
activated directly upon presentation of a digit, or after mediation by a spatial reference 
frame constructed due to culture and language.  This remains a crucial open question for 






 This paper reports two ERP experiments investigating spatial-numeric 
associations.  The first experiment was focused on associations between numerical 
magnitude and locations in “response space” conceived in terms of left-right coordinates 
of the body and especially the hands.  The second experiment was focused on 
associations between numerical magnitude and locations in visual space, conceived in 
terms of left-right coordinates of the visual field.  The key findings are reviewed below, 
followed by more general implications of the experiments.   
 Experiment 1 found that the SNARC effect in a number comparison task was 
attenuated for behavioral RTs when the first number gave complete information about the 
response that would be required after viewing the second number.  LRPs showed greater 
negativity after the presentation of the first number in this condition.  LRPS were not 
modulated by SNARC interference before the presentation of the second number to be 
compared.  In the time interval 200 ms – 400 ms after the presentation of the second 
number, LRPs were more negative for SNARC-compatible conditions, even when 
complete advance information about the required response had been communicated by 
the first number.  In roughly this same time interval, the P300 component showed robust 
effects of SNARC-compatibility as well as expectancy.  When examining later stages of 
cortical activation with more fidelity in LRPs time-locked to response offset, no SNARC 
effects were found.     
 However, lower prior response-probability was related to steeper (more negative) 
LRP slopes, and steeper slopes were predictive of faster behavioral RTs.  Interestingly, 
LRP slopes were selectively associated with behavioral RTs in SNARC-compatible 
conditions, which may suggest an underlying effect of SNARC during late response-
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execution phases that is observable at the level of individual differences but is obscured 
when making group comparisons.   
 Overall, results were consistent with those from a limited amount of previous 
ERP research into SNARC effects (Gevers, Ratinckx et al., 2006; Keus et al., 2005), 
showing that SNARC interference arises and is resolved at relatively intermediate stages 
of response-selection.  The present experiment also yielded the novel finding of P300 
modulation by SNARC-compatibility as well as expectancy.  This result is possibly 
evidence for posterior parietal involvement in generating and resolving SNARC 
interference.   
 The ERP results of Experiment 1 found SNARC effects only after presentation of 
the second number to enter into comparison, but not after the presentation of the first 
number.  This was explained by invoking a mechanism to suppress fast automatic 
activation of a spatial reference for the first number, in order to prevent premature 
responses.  When the second number was presented, there was no longer any requirement 
to withhold responding and SNARC interference was then observable in the ERPs, 
regardless of the level of facilitation for response-selection due to prior information.  
Thus, the ERPs were able to disclose SNARC-related differences in cognitive processing 
even when response-cuing was certain, which were not detectable by behavioral RTs 
alone.   
 Experiment 2 took a different approach to investigating spatial-numeric 
interactions, by presenting task-irrelevant visual events occurring in left or right visual 
fields during the time interval between the two numbers in the comparison task.  It was 
predicted based on previous work using simple target detection tasks that early visual 
ERPs would be enhanced to task-irrelevant visual probes appearing in left visual space 
after relatively small number cues, and to probes appearing in right visual space after 
relatively large number cues.  Results of this experiment were ambiguous, owing to 
technical deficiencies such as the number of trials contributing to the ERPs.  A possible 
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trend for a “size effect” was disclosed, in which ERPs were enhanced to visual probes 
after small number cues regardless of visual field.  Scalp distributions in the time window 
in which there were evident peaks in the ERP waveforms were consistent with the 
expected distribution for the N1 component, which is sensitive to attention (Luck, 2005; 
Luck et al., 2000).  This result, if taken at face value, is intriguing and merits further 
exploration.  However, the results did not show that ERPS were modulated by digit 
magnitude in a manner that interacted with left/right visual space as was predicted by 
assuming SNARC-like effects on visual attention.   
 The experiments occurred at the intersection of a broad array of motivating 
considerations, briefly reiterated in the following remarks.  Quantity and order are two 
important features of events in the world that can be described by numbers.  
Comprehending numbers is important for survival and effective action in most 
contemporary societies.  Better understanding of how numbers are represented 
psychologically and by the brain has potential implications for pedagogy and policy 
making.  There is evidence to suggest that numbers are represented in a spatial format, as 
in a directed “mental number line” in which small magnitudes are represented on the left 
and large magnitudes on the right.  This association might be viewed as an example of 
“conceptual metaphor” structures which permeate language and thought, in which 
abstract concepts like number and time are opportunistically constructed around 
representational systems for more concrete experiences of space.  In this view, abstract 
concepts like number are represented in a way that is grounded in sensorimotor 
experience and by the fact of living in a body.  This view also highlights the notion that 
perception and thought are above all in the service of effective action, and not for the 
sake of cognition as an end. 
 The association of numbers and space in body-centered spatial coordinates can 
give rise to consequences for action selection.  Choosing to respond with the left hand or 
the right hand can be hurt by the degree of alignment between the spatial location of the 
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response and the meaning associated with the response (when e.g., “right” means 
“small”).  Thus, associations between numbers and space are seen to be a source of 
“bottom-up” influence on behavior that sometimes needs to be counteracted by “top-
down” goals.  In line with these considerations, “numerate neurons” have been found in 
frontal and parietal parts of the brain, partly overlapping with brain circuits supporting 
perception and action.  Communication or cross-talk between neural populations coding 
for quantity, order, and numerosity on one hand, and for spatial attention and spatial 
response-selection on the other, suggests a possible brain mechanism for spatial-numeric 
associations; as well as for their consequences for choosing among possible actions in 
space (or attending to regions of space). 
 Together, the two experiments were motivated by the broad range of 
considerations summarized above.  The first experiment examined consequences of 
spatial-numeric associations for action in “response space.”  The second experiment 
examined them for visuospatial attention.  Extending the investigation across these 
disparate cognitive domains was motivated by the broader question of interconnections 
between visual and motor systems and whether these would be similarly or differently 
affected by spatial-numeric associations.  This question can be connected to the larger 
controversy concerning whether spatial reference frames for perception and for action are 
coded by different neural populations (Milner & Goodale, 2006) or by the same neural 
populations (Rizzollatti, Ferrari, Rozzi, & Fogassi, 2006).  This remains an important 
open question for future research.   
 Two experiments examined effects of spatial-numeric associations in the contexts 
of response-selection and visuospatial attention, in combination with other variables 
including prior response-probability, cue-validity, and spatial location.  Response-related 
LRPs showed that compared to prior response-probability, effects of SNARC-
compatibility appeared later even when stimulus-response mapping was a constant 
feature of the task environment.  Thus, SNARC effects were not automatically elicited 
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during early response-selection in advance of the imperative stimulus, but exerted 
residual effects during later response- selection that was completed after the imperative 
stimulus.  In a separate experiment, attention-related ERPs were not modulated by digit 
magnitude according to a directed mental number line.  Together the experiments suggest 
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